The Game in a Nutshell

Bailouts put the private debts onto the public (tax payer) balance sheet. Now Congress and the White House are poised to finish the job by putting that debt onto the backs of America's most vulnerable people.

For Your Convenience:

• Contact the Broadcast Media
• Contact the Newspapers
• Contact the US Senate
• Contact the House of Representatives

Sources:

San Jose, CA Board of Ed Stands with WI Unions

Jan Jose, CA Board of Education approves resolution in support of Wisconsin public workers - MORE

Paste into Twitter: http://t.co/bufQOIM

Public Option Senate Letter

Has your Senator signed on to support the public option for healthcare?

HERE IS THE LIST

Time to raise our mutual voices.

For Your Convenience:

Contact the US Senate

Contact the House of Representatives

Sources:

Real Public Option

I confess I haven't had much to say these days. Obviously, the issue of the month is health care reform. And it should be obvious that the crux of it is that real reform depends on whether or not we have a real public option.

I studied physics as an undergraduate, which teaches one how to approach complex problems. And that rests on managing the complexity by sifting through the elements of the problem, determining which are important and which are not, and approximating the solution by focusing only on the important elements.

First, a key element to our health care system is the "insurance" piece, that is, pooling a lot of people together with the understanding that only a small fraction of the people will need costly care, the cost of which is paid for by the entire pool of people... spreading the cost. It's a socialistic concept on the face of it, regardless of whether private parties or the government creates and manages the pool of people.

An important sub-element to the insurance piece is, that, everything else being equal, if a profit is taken from the insurance pool, then the cost will be higher than if no profit is taken. A side note: In principle, the government could be the insurer and take a profit to pay down the debt we've built bailing out the banks. Wouldn't that make sense?

There are other important elements, such as doctor's concern about liability and litigation. The solution there is liability insurance and perhaps some tort reform, but the physicist in me says that tort reform might be getting into a complexity that aren't essential.

Now, it's true that our bloated private health care insurance industry, with many paper pushers, creates a lot of jobs... the number 6% of our economy comes to mind... oops, according to the Washington Post, "In 1997, health care accounted for 13.6 percent of the gross domestic product" (Some say it's now 16% [1]). Of course, the health insurance piece is a fraction of that... here's the physicist again: Even if it is only 1% of the economy, the health care insurance industry's inefficiency creates a lot of jobs (I didn't say inefficient at generating profits... that it does well).

So, lets summarize up to this point: 1) Insurance is a key element of health care reform, 2) Current private heath insurance creates a lot of jobs.

So, it's true that dropping private insurance for a single payer system would be disruptive; because private insurance creates a lot of jobs, immediately ditching it for a government-run insurance for everyone without private profit, would likely put a lot of people out of work. There are work-arounds, but lets accept this premise and say, "OK, lets meet half-way and allow people to have the option of joining an insurance pool managed by the US Government."

Short of that fundamental change, the other parts of the legislative proposals are just tinkering with the old system, which doesn't really constitute reform. With today's legal framework, there's nothing to prevent the creation of an "Exchange" or "Coops;" I can go to an "exchange" every year when the state government I work for brings in the hand full of private insurance companiess and allows us the opportunity to switch providers.

Bottom Line: If the legislation passed by Congress does not include a real public option, then it's not real reform.

Now, because physicists often make simplifying assumptions in their analyses, they like to explain the little side issues after they give the bottom line.

The Phony Public Option Issue: We need to be careful of having a "public option" foisted on us in name only (the phony public option issue). Former Clinton Labor Secretary Robert Reich, who speaks truth to power, outlined some tests to determine if a public option is real or phony. I could track them down, but there's a simpler test: If the insurance industry hates the legislation, and is fighting against it tooth and nail, i.e., it is not a feel-good bi-partisan bill, then it's probably a real public option.

So, it's time to raise our voices in a variety of ways and call for a real public option.

For Your Convenience:

• Contact the Broadcast Media
  
• Contact the Newspapers
  
• Contact the US Senate
  
• Contact the House of Representatives

Sources:

1. The Private Health Insurance Industry is Killing the U.S. Economy, Huffington Post, Richard Kirsch, Rep. Jan Schakowsky April 27, 2009.

Support Edwards in Iowa Caucus

A Zogby poll shows John Edward tied with Barack Obama at 26 percent gaining on Hillary Clinton who is at 30 percent. This is confirmed by a CNN poll and a new Strategic Vision poll, released Friday, showing Edwards at 28 percent.

"Edwards had a good day by virtue especially of increasing support among independent voters," Zogby said.

Edwards led narrowly among independents over Clinton and Obama, I believe, because Edwards is NOT from the corporate wing of the Democratic party.

According to a Politico essay, other signs of hope boost Edwards' chances in Iowa:

Edwards also comes into the Jan. 3 caucuses with particular advantages... Edwards’ campaign boasts the most deeply rooted rural operation, allowing it to possibly win small precincts across the state that could prove crucial in the final tally.

Politico continues to point out that this is buttressed in

Polling by The Washington Post [which has] found that Edwards has the most support among those voters who participated in the 2004 Democratic caucuses, no small advantage for an election that measures a high turnout at 120,000 participants statewide.

Another advantage identified by Politico...

When Democrats were asked in the poll what mattered to them in deciding their vote, 32 percent said ideology, 30 percent chose charisma and 21 percent selected experience.

Clinton has campaigned on her experience, and if the election turns on ideology and charisma, it would seem to favor Obama and Edwards.

You Can Help Edwards Peak in Iowa on Jan. 3

1. Boost the Buzz with an e-mail to Iowa Media Outlets:

Contact the Des Moines Register to ... er, register your support of Edwards. There's nothing like a public outpouring to turn the heads of editors. Here's what I said:

Edwards is gaining ground. I support Edward because he's talking about "deep change," not superficial, corporate-sponsored "change."

Our Nation is faltering. We need a break from the status quo.

Thanks

2. Pledge Your Support:

Women of Steel Pledge - CLICK to sign a pledge of support. United Steel Workers pledge page allows you to do as little as state your support, or more.

3. Contact the Edwards Campaign for More Ways to Help:

Iowa Edwards Campaign:
515-288-0766

4. Let the Iowa Democratic Party Know you Support Edwards:

They're likely to pass you on to the Edwards Campaign, BUT, calls coming into the Democratic Party will add to buzz that adds to the momentum for Edwards.

Iowa Democratic Party:
515-244-7292

Get Engaged via Edwards' Web Page:

Here's the Link to his Iowa page... the main page, and contribution page, are easy to find. Every $250 dollars is matched with public funds because Edwards has gone the public funding route.

Sources:

Reuters, "Clinton leads in Iowa but Edwards gains," John Whitesides, December 31, 2007.

Senate Public Funding Bill S.936

The Senate has a "public financing bill" S.936, introduced March 20, 2007 by Richard Durbin (D-Ill) and Arlen Specter (R-PA).

Here's how it works in a nut-shell:

Step 1: Collect Seed Money
+ this is the "operating cost" money
+ Limited to $100 per doner

Step 2: Collect Qualifying Contributions
+ This is like a petition to show the candidate has support
+ Must be $5 each (not sure if the operating donations count toward this)
+ Need 2,000 contributions plus another 500 contributions from each congressional district.

Step 3: Follow Spending Limits
+ After candidates commit to and qualify for public funding, they cannot use private donations or their own money.

Step 4: Comply with Simple Rules

Step 5: Receive Enough Public Funding to Campaign
+ Senate candidates receive $750k plus $150k for each congressional district for the general election.
+ "Fair Fight" funds are provided if a privately funded candidate is highly funded.
+ Smaller amounts are provided for the primary election.

Remember: It's Voluntary
+ Because money has been defined as "free speech" by the US Supreme Court, public financing cannot be mandatory, unless we change the US Constitution.

Sources:

Public Citizen News, May/June 2007.

Privatizing War - Part 3

Guest Writer: L. Vincent Sebastian

FINAL in a Three-Part Series,

My recent posting, “Privatizing the War in Iraq”, describes the Bush administration’s growing reliance on private contractors such as Blackwater USA to conduct military operations in Iraq. Yet, the issues and potential problems with private contractors described in that posting are only the tip of the iceberg. In the new posting below, the many problems surrounding private military firms (PMFs) are more fully laid out. The source material for this posting is: P.W. Singer, “Corporate Warriors: The Rise and Ramifications of the Privatized Military Industry”, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter 2001/2002. Although Singer’s article, turned into a book, was published before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, its relevance has only increased in the last five years.

Impacts of the Privatized Military Industry on Conflict, Security, and Public Policy

The likely consequences of PMF activities fall into three broad categories: contractual dilemmas; military market dynamics and disruptions on security relations; and the policy impact of PMFs as alternative military actors.

(1) Contractual Dilemmas. Three types of contractual dilemmas are considered: the financial bottom line; monitoring and oversight, and the dependences of states on PMFs.

(a) The Bottome Line. At issue here are divided loyalties and different goals. Clear tensions exist between the client's security objectives and the PMF’s desire to maximize profit, so that the public good and the PMF’s good often conflict. In spite of claims to the contrary, the PMF may not act only in its client’s best interests. Given that the PMF’s focus is on the bottom line, it may have an incentive to cut corners to increase profits. For example, during the Balkans conflict, Brown & Root (a subsidiary of Halliburton) is alleged to have failed to deliver or severely overcharged the U.S. Army on four out of seven of its contractual obligations. In addition, PMFs have similar financial incentives to prolong their contracts and to avoid taking undue risks that might endanger their own corporate assets. The result may be a protracted conflict that could have been avoided. Finally, it is no stretch to imagine two arms of a large PMF contracting to support opposing sides in a conflict.

(b) Monitoring and Oversight. Few clients have experience in contracting with PMFs, and frequently there is little oversight and/or a lack of clearly defined requirements. Add in the fog of war, and proper monitoring becomes extremely difficult. Moreover, the actual consumer may not be the contracting party. Some nation-states pay PMFs to supply personnel on their behalf to their allies or to international organizations. The accountability gap between the server and served is becomes much wider in such cases.

(c) Dependence. As the use of PMFs becomes increasingly popular, so too does the danger that clients will become overly dependent on PMF services. Reliance on PMFs means that the client’s strategic success is vulnerable to changes in market conditions and to the client-PMF balance of power. This can result in three potential risks to the client. First, the PMF might leave its client in the lurch. A PMF may have no compunction about suspending a contract if a situation becomes financially or physically too risky. Because they are typically based elsewhere, and in the absence of applicable international laws to enforce compliance, PMFs face no real risk of punishment if they defect from their contractual obligations. The employees of PMFs cannot be forced to stay at their posts in the face danger. To the extent that entire military functions such as weapons maintenance and supply have become privatized, the entire military machine would break down if even a modest number of PMF employees chose to leave.

Second, the PMF might gain dominance over the client. In weak or failed nation-states, PMFs, which are often the most powerful force on the local scene, may take steps to protect their own interests. Thus early termination of a contract, dissatisfaction with the terms of payment, or disagreements over specific orders could lead to unpleasant repercussions for a weak client. For example, it is suspected that in 1996 Executive Outcomes helped to oust the leader of Sierra Leone, who headed the very regime that had hired it, in favor of another local general with whom the firm’s executives had a better working relationship.

Third, the PMF might engage in economic imperialism. Clients of (type 1, military provider) PMFs are often those most in need but least able to pay and thus at the highest risk of default. This imbalance can lead to the mortgaging of valuable public assets to the PMF or its associates in an attempt to align the client’s and firm’s incentives. For example, the PMF may obtain mineral rights following the fulfillment of its contract, or possibly in exchange for protecting those very resources and their production. A variation of this is the client’s promise to pay the PMF in public resources or assets currently held by enemy forces, following a successful campaign. Ultimately, the result is that valuable resources for the nation as a whole are lost in order to meet short-term exigencies.

(2) Military Market Dynamics and Disruptions. Military market dynamics and disruptions can complicate international security because military powers are no longer exclusively sovereign states but include private players. The privatized military industry is an independent, globalized supplier operating beyond any one state’s domain. Non-state actors can access formidable military capabilities, and where state structures are weak, the result is a direct challenge to state sovereign authority. Even when PMFs are hired by strong states, decision making shifts beyond the states’ immediate control and is subject to the PMF’s own motivations, with all of the uncertainty that these processes entail. The very act of military outsourcing also runs counter to the tenet that states seek to maximize their power through self-sufficiency in order to minimize their reliance on others. Five potential impacts or disruptions on the state or global security environment caused by the private military industry are considered below.

(a) The New Fungibility of Power. Today, the entire spectrum of conventional forces can be obtained in a matter of days or weeks, for a price. A state or non-state entity need not have a large population, institutional support or expertise in order to wield capable military might. The barriers to acquiring military strength are lowered, making power more fungible than ever.
This ability to quickly transform money or other economic assets into force – that is, into a military threat – makes economic power itself more threatening, contrary to conventional assumptions. The capitalist ethos tends to assume only what is positive about the profit motive, and the spread of capitalism and globalism is seen, conventionally, as a way to reduce the incentives for violent conflict. However, the emergence of the PMF as a new type of private transnational firm, which relies instead on the existence of conflict for its profits, counters the assumption that non-state economic actors are generally peace orientated.

(b) New Complexities in the Balance of Power. The privatized military industry lies beyond any one state's control. The uncertainties of a dynamic global market creates major complications for the already-difficult task of assessing the balance of power between states. In an open market, where a wide range of military services can be procured, likely outcomes become increasingly difficult to discern. Once-predictable deterrence relationships can rapidly collapse, and the hire of PMFs can quickly and unexpectedly tilt local balances of power. Arms races might become instant bidding wars on the open market, with adversaries competing first for PMF services before taking to the battlefield. The result is that the pace of the race is accelerated, and first-mover advantages are heightened. Indeed, such changes could well increase the likelihood of war initiation and preemptive strikes. In addition, conventional arms control is made more difficult with the existence of this market. A nation-state can reduce its in-house force capacity, perhaps to comply with a treaty or avoid sanctions, without reducing its overall threat potential.

(c) Changes in Strategic Relationships. The privatized military market has fundamentally altered the former patron-client relationships of the Cold War. Instead of bowing to the demands of their superpower patrons in exchange for support and protection, weaker states can buy the military skills, training, and capabilities that they need on the open market. As a result, the patron’s leverage is diminished, and weaker states are no longer bound by their patrons’ prerogatives.

Traditionally, states in alliances have divided up their military tasks, making them more dependent on one another in the process. Now that PMFs can perform some of these tasks, mutual reliance among allied states is effectively reduced. A state may then feel less need for the approval of its allies in conducting its own affair, and ultimately the alliance may become weakened. For example, NATO members rely on the U.S. to supply much of its external deployment capacity (e.g., lift capacity, logistics, intelligence gathering and analysis). However, this capacity could also be adequately supplied by type 3 PMFs (military support firms).

The PMF market also makes available new forms of aid and alliances. Because PMFs allow the easy conversion of financial resources into military might, allies can provide military aid in the guise of simple cash infusions. The rationale for this new form of aid is that it lowers potential risks for donors by reducing the likelihood of their becoming embroiled in their allies’ fighting. In addition, possible donors are no longer restricted to states. With equal ability to pay, non-state actors, including even rich individuals, can become valuable allies, able to bolster local forces and shift military balances from a distance.

(d) Non-State Actors Empowered. The global private military industry provides easy access to military services, and therefore provides non-state actors with new options and paths to power not imagined until recently. The increase in military capability of non-state groups has resulted in a widening of conflicts and a lessening of weak states’ ability to put down internal opposition. In the current unregulated market, PMFs decide for whom they work. Thus far, they have contracted with all types of clients, from reputable governments to unsavory customers; the only limitation being the ability of the client to pay. Although some PMFs contend that they work only for reputable states, both the structure of the market and the record so far argue against this. Because firms make decisions that are in their own (financial) interest, single-shot payoffs from disreputable clients might prove too great a temptation, especially if the relationship can be hidden. PMFs that have difficulty attracting the business of reputable clients in the competitive market are the most likely to work with violent non-state entities.

(e) The Military Market Human Rights Abuses. Tensions exist regarding the impact of PMFs on human rights during conflict. On the one hand, PMFs point to market incentives for engaging in good behavior, as their long-term profits are partly dependent on having a good public image. PMFs also emphasize the positive impact that they might have in helping to professionalize local forces. On the other hand, however, war is a business in which nice firms might not finish first. PMF aspirations of corporate responsibility and a good-guy image may be overridden by the need to fulfill a contract or by the desire to be seen as the kind of firm that gets things done. Thus, in certain situations human rights may be transgressed for the corporate interest. For example, Executive Outcomes is known to have used fuel air explosives (FAEs or vacuum bombs) in its Angola operations. International organizations regard the use of FAEs as a transgression of human rights, because they inflict particularly torturous injuries. But FAEs are also highly effective, which explains why a firm would choose to use them.

The private military industry is an outlet for those naturally drawn to mercenary work and is likely to attract disreputable players looking for the cover of legitimacy. As employers, PMFs want to hire individuals who will be effective, even if this means casting a blind eye on past human rights abuses. As a result, many members of the most ruthless military and intelligence units (from the Soviet Union and the apartheid regime in South Africa) have found employment in the industry. Even when firms scrupulously screen prospective employees (which is easier said than done, given that most CVs do not have an “atrocities committed” section), it is still difficult to monitor troops in the field. If employees do commit violations, there is little incentive for firms to report them. A firm that does so risks scaring off both clients and prospective employees. Even if external legal action or sanctions were attempted, it is doubtful whether any PMF would allow its employees to be tried in a client state’s judicial system.

The ultimate problem with PMFs is that they diffuse responsibility. Questions about who monitors, regulates, and punishes employees or companies that go astray (“rogue firms”) have not been fully answered. That many of these firms are chartered in offshore accounts complicates the matter even further. In sum, privatization provides no greater assurance of moral military behavior and may even produce countervailing incentives.

(3) The Policy Impact of PMFs as Alternative Military Actors. The civilian-military relationship is a story of institutional balance (and sometimes imbalance), where civilian control over the military vies with the military’s need for autonomy to do its jobs. The privatized military industry may upset this balance because it supplants core military positions and functions. PMFs may be attractive to leaders, to the extent that they allow them to get rid of politically unreliable or untrustworthy military officers. Of course, local militaries know this and may seek to preempt such action if PMFs are to deploy. Additionally, the hire of PMFs would be destabilizing if any of the following conditions applies: (a) PMF employees receive higher pay than local soldiers for performing similar tasks; (b) PMF employees have vastly better equipment, (c) PMF employees are kept separate and distinct from local forces, or (d) PMF officers are placed in command positions or their presence blocks normal promotion tracks. At least (a) and (b), and possible (c) and (d) as well, are common in the relationship between U.S. troops and private forces currently in Iraq.

The rise of the privatized military industry provides a new means for leaders to evade public policy restrictions. In the U.S., for example, the executive branch can use PMFs as a means to circumvent limits placed on it by the Congress or by public opinion. The president, as commander in chief, may resort to using PMFs if he wishes to avoid the potential political costs of other actions (e.g., reinstating the draft), or if Congress places limits on troop numbers. Recourse to PMFs therefore has negative implications for the democratic principle of checks and balances. It may allow the executive branch to gain too much autonomy and power and undertake public-private activities against the intent of Congress.

The use of PMFs also allows the executive branch to avoid both public debate of its policies and accountability for results. Responsibility and accountability on the part of public officials are greatly diminished because the use of PMFs moves decision making power one step further away from elected representatives. The use of PMFs instead of official covert action provides the cover of plausible deniability that public forces lack. If an operation goes awry, the activities of a firm are easier for a government to deny and the blame easier to shift. But, without public debate and monitoring, the actions of PMFs may prove embarrassing or worse. In Colombia, for example, Airscan was implicated in coordinating the bombing of a village in which eighteen civilians (including nine children) were killed. In addition, PMF operations might even backfire and ultimately involve the client in direct fighting without the requisite public debate.

Conclusion

The rise of the modern privatized military industry has created a host of new problems and challenges. Nation-states no longer have an exclusive role in the military sphere. International institutions, non-state organizations, corporations, and even individuals can now lease military capabilities of the highest level from the global market. In terms of policy, just as Western militaries recently had to develop a system for working with NGOs during humanitarian operations, they now must also consider how to deal with PMFs, which they will increasingly encounter in the field. At the decision-making level, governments and international organizations must develop standard contracting policies and establish vetting and monitoring systems attuned to PMFs, including the assurance of legislative oversight. A policy that defers to the market will not curb threats to peace. PMFs, to the extent that they are, or are part of, publicly traded corporations, have a legal requirement to generate maximum profits for their shareholders. Not only is this a mandate for PMFs to seek out conflict wherever they can find it, but it is also a strong incentive to promote the escalation of existing tensions and even instigate new conflict where it does not yet exist. After all, they are in the business of war.

This concludes the three-part series.

Part 1: The Privatized Military Industry in the Global Context

Part 2: Organization and Operation of the Privatized Military Industry
.

Lebanon: Village Damage by District

This page is work in progress...

"Lebanon is divided into six governorates, which are further subdivided into 25 districts. The districts themselves are also divided into several municipalities, each enclosing a group of cities or villages." (Wikipedia) All the governorates and their respective districts are listed at the end of the report with a map.

There are about 200 villages south of the Latani River (See Map of Southern Lebanon below, which includes Israeli attacks on UN compounds south of the Latani River).

The following is a summary of damage by governorate, district and village. The primary source is the USAID Lebanon Situation Reports (LSR), which often cite other sources. I've tried to provide report dates and Situation Report numbers.

Beirut Governorate

(There are no "districts" in Beirut. Only the city and neighorhoods).

HOUSING:
Of 120 damaged buildings surveyed that housed 2000 families, 40 need to be reconstructed. About 6,000 housing units were destroyed and 17,000 damaged. (Preliminary report. (LSR32 Sept. 1).

PUBLIC BUILDINGS:

UTILITIES:
Water and sewer piplines in major streets of Haret Hreik Municipality sustained significant damage (LSR38 Sept 12).

Nabatiyeh Governorate (Jabal Amel)

Al-Nabatiyé District

50 percent of all structures were destroyed in the villages of Yohmor and Western Zawtar. (LSR26, Aug. 23).

HOUSING:
Nabatiye Village: 50 percent of the homes destoryed, numerous unexploded ordinance remain.

PUBLIC BUILDINGS:

UTILITIES:
Drinking water sources and waste treatment capacity destroyed south of Nabatiye, Marjayoun including Qaliaiaa (often the collection and distribution pipeline systems are damaged). (LSR32 Sept. 1)
Water remains a concern: Villages of Zaoutar Ghariya, Zaoutar Shargiya and Yahmour. (LSR35 Sept. 6)

* Hasbyya

Marji'youn District

50 percent of all buildings destroyed in Markabe Village. (LSR24)

HOUSING:
Ghanduriyah village: 90 percent of the homes destroyed. (LSR30)
Houla village: 20 percent of the homes destroyed. (LSR20)
Markaba village: 50 percent of the homes destroyed. (LSR20)
Mays al Jabal village: 30 percent of the homes destroyed. (LSR20)
Qantarah (Cantarah): 50 percent of the homes destroyed. (LSR20)
Talusha village: 15 percent of the homes destroyed. (LSR20)
Tayyababh village: 80 percent of the homes destroyed. (LSR20)

PUBLIC BUILDINGS:

UTILITIES:
District affected by damage to three major pumping stations.
Khiam, water and sewer networks destroyed (LSR35 Sept. 6)
Marjaba village: Central water tank and pumps damaged, nonfunctinal.
Markaba and Taibe water needs remained as of Sept 8 (LSR38 Sept. 12)
Taibi, Adaisi, Deir Seryan, Kantara, Kfar Kila, Talousse, Rab Tlateen and Markaba, Mais Al Jabal, Blida and Houla water and waste piplines damaged (LSR32 Sept. 1)

A large plume of smoke billows in the town of Khiam, in southern Lebanon, Tuesday, July 25, 2006, after Israeli air raids targeted it. For as sense of scale, note the size at the base of the plume, compared to the houses in front of the plume. An Israeli bombardment hit a UN observer post in the village of Khiam, killing four UN observers. (AP Photo/Lotfallah Daher).

Bint Jbeil District (Bent Jbail, Bint Jubayl)

HOUSING:
Ayta As Shaab: 70 percent of the homes and other properties were destroyed or badly damaged. (LSR24)
Bayt Leif: 30 percent of the homes destroyed (LSR21)
Bint Jbeil: 800 properties destroyed, 1,100 significantly damaged. (LSR36)
Borj Qalaouiye: 20 houses destroyed, 80 heavily damaged. (LSR38)
Kafra: 25 percent destroyed (LSR21)
Khiam village: 750 homes destroyed, 1,000 homes heavily damaged, 1,000 lightly damaged.
Majdel Silim: 200 homes destroyed, about 350 damaged out of 700. (LSR36)
Qabrikha: 100 homes destroyed, 75 damaged out of 480. (LSR36)
Soultaniye: Significant damage to houses. (LSR38)

PUBLIC BUILDINGS:
50 to 90 percent of the government and public buildings in 39 villages in the Bent Jbail district destroyed. (LSR 26 Aug. 29)

UTILITIES:
Affected by damage to three major pumping stations: Villages of Maroun er Ras, Aainata, Qabrikha and Kounine (LSR36 Sept 7)
Majdel Silim: Need water pumps (LSR36)
Soultaniye: Need for water tanks. (LSR38 Sept 12)

UXO:
Majdel Silim: UXO scattered through the village.

Beqaa Governorate (Bekaa)

Al-Hirmil District (Hermel)
Hermel village had the most significant structural damage in Bekaa.

HOUSING:

PUBLIC BUILDINGS:

UTILITIES:
North Bekaa water supply in need of urgent repairs.

Baalbeck District



HOUSING:
Baalbek: 2,000 homes destroyed. (LSR24)
Taibe: Significant damage to houses. (LSR38)

PUBLIC BUILDINGS:

UTILITIES:
North Bekaa: water supply in need of urgent repairs.
Taibe village: Need for water tanks (LSR38 Sept. 12)

South Governorate

(al-Janoub)
* Tyre (Sur, Sour)

HOMES:
Jabal al Butm village: 50 percent of the homes destroyed. (LSR21 Aug. 16)
Zibquin village: 60 percent destroyed. (LSR21 Aug. 16)

PUBLIC BUILDINGS:

UTILITIES:
Lack safe water and reliable power: Villages of Deir Qanoun, Qana, Ramadya, Knisse, Henniyeh, and Zibquin. (LSR35 Sept. 6)
Water and sanitation concerns: Villages of Srifa, Maarake (LSR37 Sept. 8)








Beirut Governorate

The Beirut Governorate is not divided into districts and is limited to the city of Beirut.

Nabatiyeh Governorate (Jabal Amel) - 4 districts

* Al-Nabatiyé
* Hasbyya
* Marji'youn
* Bint Jbeil

Beqaa Governorate - 5 districts

* Al-Hirmil (Hermel)
* Baalbeck
* Zahlé
* Western Beqaa (al-Beqaa al-Gharbi)
* Rashyya

North Governorate (al-Shamal) - 7 districts

* Akar
* Tripoli
* Zgharta
* Bshirri
* Batroun
* Koura
* Miniyeh-Danniyeh

Mount Lebanon Governorate (Jabal Lubnan) - 6 districts

* Jbeil
* Kisirwan
* Al-Matn
* Ba'abda
* Alay
* Al-Shouf

South Governorate (al-Janoub) - 3 districts

* Saida
* Tyre (Sur)
* Jezzine

CLICK for Detailed Map of Southern Lebanon boarder area - 1986

Lebanon Village Districts, below




Source: USAID Disaster Assistance daily situation reports, which often cite other sources, like the Lebanese government and the United Nations.









Click for painting, "Lebanon Village 2006"