Showing posts with label liquidity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label liquidity. Show all posts

September 10, 2011

"We Didn't See it Coming"

For Some reason, my comments on Paul Krugman's blog don't seem to stick. Below is my comment on his post entitled: How We Failed

The "We didn't see it coming" thing drives me crazy. My experience in seeing it [the bubble burst] coming is reflected in three clear memories.

First, The Great Unraveling by... some economist from NJ, pretty much had me change my ARM to a fixed rate mortgage a couple years before the bust.

Second, people with good jobs in my solid middle class neighborhood were saying, "If I had to buy my [modest row] house today, I couldn't afford it." I remember exactly where I was, walking my dog.

Third, it was going to by systemic: "Systemic Risk: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Role of OFEHO," February, 2003, which lost Armamndo Falcon his job. http://www.ofheo.gov/Media/Archive/docs/reports/sysrisk.pdf


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September 29, 2008

TED Spread Yikes!

The TED spread is an indicator of perceived credit risk in the general economy. The bigger the TED spread, the greater fear among banks that an over-night loan from one bank to another won't be paid back.

The TED spread is the difference between the three-month T-bill interest rate and three-month LIBOR (LIBOR reflects the credit risk of lending to commercial banks, where as T-bills are considered risk-free... we'll see how long that lasts).

During the summer of 2007, the Subprime mortgage crisis ballooned the TED spread to about 1.5-2.0%.

On September 17, 2008, the record set after the Black Monday crash of 1987 was broken as the TED spread exceeded 3.0%.

Today, we're looking at a TED spread of 3.5%. Yikes!

Sources:

Wikipedia so it must not be true.

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August 23, 2007

How Bad is the Liquidity Crisis?

How bad is it?

Lets take a simple example. Suppose you're short on cash to pay your bills, because you're between jobs; however, your pay checks will start up again in a month. Then, all you need to do is bridge that one-month gap, and you will survive your "liquidity crisis."

Today's liquidity crisis is founded on bad mortgage loans, which were used as collateral for creating credit that is 5-to-10 times the amount of the underlying value of the mortgages. The magic of leverage... remember, banks are only required to hold a fraction of their outstanding loan value in reserve, because it is very unlikely that everyone will ask for their money back at the same time. Unfortunately, people are effectively asking for their money back at the same time, because they realize the collateral (mortgages) are turning sour. But the banks don't really have that money; the reserves are just a fraction of leveraged loans, hence a liquidity crisis on a large scale.

So, how bad is the liquidity crisis? In the simple example above, of being between pay checks, the "crisis" wasn't so bad, because the funds started flowing again after a month. Aside from the obvious issue of scale, the large scale crisis can be measured in several ways.

First, it is a crisis of leverage. If you a bank has 1 million cash dollars in its vault, and uses that as "reserve" on loans of 10 million dollars, it's taking a risk everyone will demand that $10 million in cash at the same time. it doesn't exist. Only $1 million in cash exists.

Second, if, suddenly, everyone finds out that the $1 million in "cash" is actually bonds "backed up" by mortgages, and those mortgages are bad loans, and they might never see "cash" again, they get panicky and start asking for the cash now... but again, there is no "cash," just worthless mortgage backed bonds.

Now, if only those bonds had some worth, then the panic would end. We'd be back to the normal mode of a fraction of reserves being held by the bank, with the unlikelihood that everyone would demand cash simultaneously.

So, like waiting for the next pay check, "how bad" depends on how long until those mortgages become solid again. One estimate has it as a long gap to fill. Referring to the increasing number of bad loans, Doug Duncan, Mortgage Bankers Association Chief Economist says:

We expect another two to four quarter[s] of modest rises in delinquencies. And foreclosures lag one to two quarters behind that.


So, the current reserves, based on mortgage backed securities, have at least a year's worth of increasing rates of defaults left to play out before the rate of defaults begins to taper off.

That's a very large time gap to fill. We can expect a bail out on the backs of tax payers.

Sources:

Best and Worst U.S. Housing Markets, Forbes, Matt Woolsey, August 22, 2007.

August 19, 2007

Alarming Countrywide Financial Liquidity Credit Line

What does Countrywide Financial do if the $11.5 billion credit line isn't enough?

The timing of the Fed's action was also notable as it followed in the wake of an alarming announcement Thursday from Countrywide Financial (CFC) that it had drawn down the entirety of its $11.5 billion unsecured credit facility to supplement its funding liquidity position.


Emphasis added to "entirety."

Sources:

Weekly Recap - Week ending 17-Aug-07

August 14, 2007

The Chain in the Real Estate Reaction

The simple domestic chain reaction in the current financial crisis is outlined below. We're facing a systemic financial crisis; failure in one sector of the economy is spreading to the larger economy threatening a substantial reduction in aggregate economic activity.

Before outlining the chain reaction, some background. It didn't take an economist to know that this was coming. We've known that pronouncements about a robust economy were hollow, and reflect a phony Wall Street economy that has little in common with the Main Street economy.

First, we knew the dot-com phenomenon was a bubble built on hype, and it burst. In the run up to the burst, dot-com seminars devolved to lessons on how to hype a product concept and cash out to a big firm.

Next, we watched the dot-com bubble-wealth run to stocks on Wall Street in a transparent irrational exuberance. That new bubble burst as the fraudulent practices of the corporate sector were exposed. All of the corporate sectors were in on it: Banks were financing bogus business activities, the consulting divisions of accounting firms were helping cook the same books being certified by their audit divisions, legal firms were helping corrupt clients wiggle out of the illegalities, the corporate media was singing the praises of the robber barons, and the good will of various civic organizations was being purchased with philanthropy from the corrupt corporations. This is all continues.

Third, after the Wall Street bubble burst, the accumulated wealth ran to real estate, triggering an upward series of self-fulfilling cycles of price increases. Laws to prevent predatory lending practices were gone and boundaries on who could finance real estate were lifted. The bubble inflated as people bought multiple properties on the back of cash from refinanced properties. Some of that activity was legitimate, and the profits were somewhat real... "somewhat" real, as long as the Federal Reserves' current struggle to bail out the financial institutions doesn't cause inflation that decreases the "real" value of those profits. You know you have a bubble when practically everyone is saying, "You know, I couldn't even afford to buy the house I'm now living in." That bubble is deflating. Where will the money run to create the next bubble?

So, what makes up the the chain in the real estate reaction?

  • Home Buyer (Borrowers)
  • Lenders to Home Buyers
  • Mortgage Brokers (not always the lender themselves)
  • Mortgage Buyers/Bundlers (Create Mortgage-backed Securities (MBS - bonds))
  • MBS (Bond) Buyers (e.g, Pension Funds, University Endowments, Hedge Funds, Banks use them as reserves)*
  • Primary Dealers (21 large commercial banks that interact directly with the Federal Reserve and with whom large lenders deal)
  • Federal Reserve
How does the chain reaction work?

First, the prices on homes are artificially inflated by excessive accumulated wealth and rules rigged to help an elite minority make more wealth off of the real estate market as described above. This is a failure of the capitalist system, which makes homes unaffordable even to middle income people, setting them up as scapegoats.

Second, mortgage brokers scam buyers into accepting exotic loans, such as interest-only adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), assuring them that "This is common these days. It's just the way things work." The mortgage broker has no risk. He just takes a fee and never holds the mortgage. The lender only holds the mortgage briefly, usually selling it to the secondary market, experiencing no risk. The secondary market buys bundles of mortgages that are used as collateral on bonds known as mortgage backed securities (MBSs). These are sold to pension funds, endowments, and others, including banks that use them to meet their reserve obligations.

The risk associated with the mortgage is passed on so far from the the point of initiation that the system seemed designed for failure. Actually, it was designed by votes in Congress paid for by lobbyists whose clients knew they could make money off the system before they knew it would fail. An insider's game. Yes, we could see what was coming, and we knew "the economy" was a house of cards, despite what well-paid business pundits were saying on phony TV.

If you think this type of game is limited to real estate sector, think again. This same game has become the American way, according the a recent report by the US Comptroller General comparing the United States to failing Rome.

But I digress...

Third, the buyer who, was scammed by mortgage brokers into taking a very risky mortgage, can't meet the payment; maybe the rate has finally adjusted on the ARM, or a health problem is limiting income and creating additional costs. They buyer becomes the scapegoat. The financial industry saw this coming and worked with both Republicans and Democrats in 2005 to toughen the US personal bankruptcy law, contributing to the creation of what Warren Buffet calls a "debt peonage" society.

Fourth, as the "debt peons" fail to pay their artificially inflated mortgages, the owners of the mortgage backed bonds don't receive their regular dividends. Many large banks to own such bonds as part of their mandatory reserve. Not only are their reserves losing value, but in many cases, banks and others take out low interest loans to buy such bonds (a carry trade: low interest loan pays for higher interest investment and the difference is taken as profit). Without the income from the mortgage backed bonds, these banks and others can't pay their loans. It's a classic carry trade trap that has caused the failure financial institutions in the past.

In many cases, the lender who provided the loan for the mortgage bonds also has debt payments to make, or has loaned out the same dollar 5 times as part of the leveraging that is implicit in fractional reserve banking (banks only hold a small fraction of hard money, or bonds, in reserve to back up their loans. They assume it is very unlikely for everyone to demand their cash at the same time. Note that some of that "hard money" is in the form of mortgage backed bonds...).

If the institutions caught in this kind of bind are big enough, there is a risk of a domino effect affecting the entire economy. It's already expected to happen, given layoffs of failed mortgage companies like American Home Mortgage, and First Magnus Financial Corp., and reduced purchases of hardware and home products associated with the exchange of home purchases, a large sector of the US economy. You know you have a crisis when the Federal Reserve steps in to give short-term loans in the hope that these chain reaction liquidity problems can be resolved. They buy bonds from primary dealers, who in turn make credit available to banks facing a liquidity crisis.

Macro-scale Liquidity Crisis

This is an example of a direct chain of liquidity crises at the micro economic scale among individual institutions. But there's also a macro economic liquidity crisis, which takes the form of less money available for loans. Recall above we mentioned that some banks use mortgage backed bonds as their reserves. The logic follows:

1. Much of the world's investments are in real estate and related financial instruments (MBSs), because of the historic real estate boom over the last six years. This means a lot of mortgage backed bonds are sitting in vaults out there, including as reserves (collateral to support loans).

2. As the value of these mortgage backed bonds declines, bank's reserves shrink. They can loan out less money, that is, credit liquidity shrinks on a macro scale.

Going International

That's the domestic story for the US. The macro-scale story continues as the financial problems jumped the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans . That's a separate story.

March 20, 2007

National Mortgage Bad News

From a skim of today's National Mortgage News, the news is not good. Mortgage lenders are cutting staff, purchase agreements for the sale of mortgage companies are being amended drastically to cut the sale price, Senate hearings are being scheduled, forclosure guidelines are getting lots of attention, Fannie Mae is selling off assets, the rating compainies can't seem to keep up with analyses to downgrade mortgage backed securities and mortgage companies.

The talk all seems to be about the secondary mortgage market. But one article stands out:
Wall Street wants to get its arms around rising subprime loan defaults as fast as possible so it can move forward with the least disruption to the markets...
In other words, Wall Street wants to staunch the spread of a liquidity crisis to other sectors of the economy.

NovaStar Cans 17% of Its Staff

Struggling subprime funder NovaStar Financial trimmed its work force by 17% -- 350 positions -- on Friday, citing the changing landscape of the mortgage industry. Click here for more...

People's Choice Shedding Workers?

People's Choice Financial Corp. -- which recently pulled a key registration statement with securities regulators -- is contemplating significant layoffs and has not funded a loan in more than a week, according to industry sources. Click here for more...

Accredited Facing Delisting

Accredited Home Lenders, San Diego, has been notified by the NASDAQ stock exchange that it will be delisted because it did not file its annual 10-K report by March 15. Click here for more...

Fieldstone Sale Price Cut by 28%

Credit-Based Asset Servicing and Securitization LLC will pay 28% less for Fieldstone Investment Corp., Columbia, Md., under an amended purchase agreement disclosed March 16. Click here for more...

Dodd Sets Subprime Hearing

Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher J. Dodd, D-Conn., says he is looking for ways to prevent millions of subprime borrowers from losing their homes and will be pressing regulators and industry representative for solutions at a March 22 committee hearing. Click here for more...

Reich: B&C Guidance Frowns on 2/28 'Steering'

The recently proposed federal subprime lending guidance reminds lenders that they should help consumers make informed choices and not steer them into 2/28 adjustable-rate mortgages when they might qualify for another product, according to Office of Thrift Supervision Director John Reich. Click here for more...

FTC Cites Foreclosure Guidelines

Servicers should not start foreclosure proceedings until a borrower has missed three monthly payments of principal and interest, according to a Federal Trade Commission attorney. Click here for more...

Street Seeking to Get Handle on B&C Defaults

Wall Street wants to get its arms around rising subprime loan defaults as fast as possible so it can move forward with the least disruption to the markets, according to a loss mitigation firm hired to get a fix on polls of nonperforming mortgages. Click here for more...

CoreLogic Predicts 13% ARM Foreclosure Rate

A study by First American CoreLogic predicts that 1.1 million of the 8.37 million adjustable-rate mortgage loans originated between 2004 and 2006 will end up in foreclosure over a six- to seven-year period. Click here for more...

Citi Buys Fannie LIHTC Portfolio

Citibank NA has purchased from Fannie Mae a portfolio of investments representing approximately $676 million in federal Low Income Housing Tax Credits, according to the two companies. Click here for more...

Fannie Adjusts Series K Dividend Rate

Fannie Mae has announced a dividend rate adjustment for its series K variable-rate noncumulative preferred stock. Click here for more...

Fitch: Subprime Exposure Drops for ABCP

Subprime-related mortgage exposure for U.S. asset-backed commercial paper programs fell sharply in the fourth quarter, though it remained high by historical standards, according to Fitch Ratings. Click here for more...

Fitch Downgrades Morgan Stanley MBS Classes

Twenty-seven classes from 15 Morgan Stanley subprime mortgage-backed securities have been downgraded by Fitch Ratings. Click here for more...

Moody's Downgrades GSAMP MBS Classes

Six certificates from three GSAMP Trust deals issued in 2006 have been downgraded by Moody's Investors Service. Click here for more...

MASTR MBS Classes Downgraded

Three tranches from two deals issued by MASTR Second Lien Trust have been downgraded by Moody's Investors Service, and one tranche has been placed under review for possible downgrade. Click here for more...

SACO MBS Class Downgraded; 9 on Review

Class B-3 of SACO I Trust 2004-3 has been downgraded from B3 to Caa2 by Moody's Investors Service, and nine other certificates from various SACO I deals have been placed on review for possible downgrade. Click here for more...

Moody's Eyes New Century MBS Classes

Five certificates from New Century Home Equity Loan Trust series 2006-S1 have been placed on review for possible downgrade by Moody's Investors Service. Click here for more...

Terwin MBS Classes on Review

The ratings of five classes from three Terwin Mortgage Trust securitizations have been placed on review for possible downgrade by Moody's Investors Service. Click here for more...

Fremont MBS Classes Under Review

Four certificates from Fremont Home Loan Trust series 2006-B have been placed on review for possible downgrade by Moody's Investors Service. Click here for more...

Ace MBS Classes Under Review

Four certificates from Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust have been placed on review for possible downgrade by Moody's Investors Service. Click here for more...

Moody's Eyes Long Beach MBS Classes

Classes M-7, B-1, and B-2 from Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust series 2006-A have been placed on review for possible downgrade by Moody's Investors Service. Click here for more...

Merrill MBS Classes Placed on Review

Two subordinated certificates from Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust series 2004-SL1 and 2004-SL2 have been placed on review for possible downgrade by Moody's Investors Service.