Guest Conributor: L. Vincent Sebastian
In recent years Blackwater USA, a private military and security contractor, has made the news on a number of fronts due to its involvement in the Iraq War, the global War on Terror, and other foreign policy/ military initiatives of the Bush Administration (see prior postings on Blackwater on this website). Tragic episodes in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in the deaths of employees of Blackwater and its affiliates, and this in turn led to two high-profile lawsuits against Blackwater. A third lawsuit alleging corporate espionage was brought about by Blackwater against one of its former employees. In each of these suits, Blackwater has followed the three-pronged strategy used by the Bush administration of maintaining secrecy, bullying the opposition, and denying accountability to the bitter end. First, a brief review of the suits:
Lawsuit #1. In March, 2004, four Blackwater security guards were attacked and killed by a frenzied mob as they escorted a supply convoy through Fallujah, Iraq. The families of these employees then sued Blackwater, accusing the company of breaking its contractual obligations to the four men by sending them into hostile territory unprepared and failing to provide them with appropriate equipment such as armored vehicles or even a map. This lawsuit, which had made its way to the Supreme Court in a series of unsuccessful appeals by Blackwater, was recently sent to arbitration. Last month (May, 2007), a federal judge ordered the lawsuit to be decided behind closed doors, allowing Blackwater to avoid public examination of its practices in Iraq. Apparently, the employment contracts signed by these security guards contained an arbitration clause. Arbitration is a non-judicial process that has a number of advantages for Blackwater. There is no right to a trial by jury. The verdict is final and binding. There is no appeal. There is no right to discovery, which means the plaintiffs do not have the same access to internal documents, Blackwater documents. The proceedings are confidential and the outcome is confidential.
Lawsuit #2. Blackwater’s aviation division is being sued by the families of three U.S. soldiers who were killed in a plane crash in Afghanistan in November of 2004. This was a plane operated by Blackwater's aviation affiliate, Presidential Airways of Florida. All six people aboard died, the three Presidential civilian crewmen and the three soldiers. The plane was ferrying the men from an airfield in Bagram, Afghanistan, to Farah, Afghanistan, and was not flying a combat mission. According to the suit, Blackwater sent the men to their deaths in an under-equipped and poorly manned aircraft. The plane lacked even the most basic safety equipment. It had no global positioning system or radar. Its crew did not wear oxygen masks. And its two pilots, who had been in Afghanistan only two weeks and had never flown the route before, failed to take the basic step of filing a flight plan, which led to a delay in finding the wreckage. In late 2006, the National Transportation Safety Board found that unprofessional behavior by the Presidential Airways flight crew was a key cause of the crash. The Board concluded that the crew deliberately avoided the standard route and took a joy ride in another direction, eventually becoming trapped in a canyon and slamming into a mountainside. The unorthodox route contributed to a delay in locating the wreckage. Had rescuers reached the site sooner, one of the servicemen (Harley Miller) might have been saved, the investigators found. Last month (May, 2007), Blackwater was in federal appeals court in Miami today trying to get that case thrown out.
Lawsuit #3. On Feb. 21, 2006 Blackwater filed a lawsuit against former employee Curtis Smith, claiming that Smith gave trade secrets (an accounting system) to Covenant Special Projects, a rival security company in Northern Virginia where Smith now works. Blackwater actually has an affidavit from Smith in which he admits giving away trade secrets. Smith claims, however, that the statement was induced under duress and intimidation in a Blackwater conference room where he was confined against his will. After Blackwater filed suit, Smith countersued Blackwater and its executive vice president, William Mathews, alleging that his affidavit was extracted under duress. The day after Blackwater’s lawsuit was filed, Virginia Beach police raided Smith's home, authorized by a search warrant issued on suspicion of computer fraud and computer trespass, which are criminal offenses. According to the police report, the raid yielded a computer, related equipment and papers. But to date, Smith has not been charged with any crime. This criminal investigation is continuing as the civil case unfolds. Smith says that trade secret in question is a generic technique that uses simple accounting principles and that he gave up no confidential information. Moreover, he says, Blackwater has made it difficult for him to defend himself by failing to specify the trade secrets he is alleged to have stolen, saying that the information is classified. It so happens that the leader of the police raid, Maj. Jon Worthington of the Camden County, VA Sheriff's Office, moonlights as an instructor on Blackwater's Moyock, NC compound, and that the Virginia Beach Police Department leases a training facility there.
The move of the Fallujah lawsuit to arbitration will keep Blackwater away from the light of a courtroom, where many had expected to learn details about this firm and the private army it fields in Iraq and elsewhere. What is interesting is that Blackwater did not make much of disputing the specific allegations of the Fallujah lawsuit. Instead, Blackwater attorneys (which have included former Whitewater prosecutor Kenneth Starr and current White House Counsel Fred Fielding) argued that the company should not face scrutiny in civilian courts because the contracting industry is an extension of the military. That is, they took the legal approach that says, “We can’t be sued.” Blackwater argued in both the Fallujah and Afghanistan suits that it is part of the U.S. “total force” and therefore should be entitled to the same immunity from civilian litigation for wrongful death, for casualties in a war zone, enjoyed by the US military. (In February 2006, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld classified Blackwater and other contractors as legitimate parts of the total force making up the U.S. war machine.)
Blackwater has also tried to block the testimony of witnesses who worked for Blackwater and who are thought to have information that would show that questionable activities took place in the days leading up to the four men being killed in Fallujah. In particular, Blackwater was able to block the deposition of a former Blackwater manager, claiming that this former employee potentially was in possession of information that, if it was revealed publicly, could damage the national security of the United States.
At the same time, however, Blackwater’s lobbyists and PR specialists at the Alexander Strategy Group (the Republican lobbying firm operated by senior staffers of former Rep.Tom DeLay) were in the media proclaiming how it would be inappropriate to apply the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the court-martial system, to Blackwater operatives, because they are civilians. So, Blackwater wants it both ways: the secrecy and immunity enjoyed by the military, but not the military’s system of accountability.
Blackwater uses a secrecy-at-all-costs approach to doing business not only with the courts, but also with the U.S. Congress. “(The Fallujah) incident was a bit of a wake up call to many people to not only the extent of the private security contracting but the questions surrounding it,” said North Carolina Rep. David Price, who helped add increased contracting oversight measures to the defense authorization bill approved recently by the House. Blackwater is notoriously reticent to discuss the details of its business, and Congress has struggled at times to get answers about Blackwater and others in the private military contracting industry. Blackwater has repeatedly refused to turn over documents related to deadly incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has stone-walled to the point of telling Rep. Henry Waxman, chair of the House Government Oversight Committee, that they cannot provide him with documents because they are classified.
Of the three lawsuits discussed above, Blackwater wants only one of them to go to court: the one that it initiated (against its former employee). Here, the corporation has sought to intimidate an individual through a coerced affidavit and a “police” raid carried out by one of its part-time employees. But even here, Blackwater continues its national security-based argument for secrecy.
Other recent commentary: The Bush administration has engaged in private contracting on a scale previously unimagined, and we need to have a handle on it (Rep. David Price). “We're spending an awful lot of money on these companies, and people still can't define their role” (John Pike, a military analyst with think tank GlobalSecurity.org). “The losers in this development are ultimately the American people,” (Jeremy Scahill, author of “Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army”).
End Notes: How connected is Blackwater to the Bush administration and to the Republican Party? In addition to the connections mentioned above, consider the following.
* Since February 2005, J. Cofer Black has been Vice Chairman of Blackwater USA. From December 2002 to November 2004 he was the U.S. Department of State Coordinator for Counterterrorism with the rank of Ambassador at Large. He was a key figure in the rendition program, the government-sanctioned “kidnap-and-torture” program, where suspected terrorist prisoners are sent to third-country locations to be interrogated. Black is also chairman of a new privatized intelligence company called Total Intelligence Solutions that is being bankrolled by Erik Prince, the head of Blackwater. Recently, presidential candidate Mitt Romney tapped Black to be his senior advisor on counter-terrorism.
* Mitt Romney grew up in Michigan and is the son of former Michigan governor George Wilcken Romney (1907 -1995). The elder Romney was the chairman of American Motors Corporation from 1954 to 1962 and was the Republican Governor of Michigan from 1963 to 1969. He was also a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 1968 but lost to Richard Nixon.
* Erik Prince, the head and founder of Blackwater, also grew up in Michigan where his father, Edgar Prince (died 1995) founded a company in 1965 called Prince Manufacturing (Prince Automotive) in Holland, Michigan, which serviced the auto industry. Revenue from this company was used to fuel the rise of the religious right in America. The elder Prince gave seed money to Gary Bauer to found the Family Research Council, where Erik Prince was once an intern. The Prince’s were also significant bankrollers of James Dobson and his group Focus on the Family. Erik Prince was a Navy SEAL (one of the wealthiest people ever to join the SEALS) prior to founding Blackwater. His reason for founding Blackwater was to anticipate government outsourcing of training and firearm-related activity. This closely followed a Halliburton study commissioned by Dick Cheney (as George H.W. Bush’s Secretary of Defense) on how to further privatize the military bureaucracy.
Sources:
“Afghanistan: Families Sue Private Contractor Over Soldiers' Deaths”
Kristin Collins, The News & Observer, June 14, 2005
“Crew's behavior is blamed for '04 plane crash in Afghanistan”
Bill Sizemore, The Virginian-Pilot, December 7, 2006
“The Rise of Blackwater”
Sandip Roy, New America Media, April 24, 2007
“US: Blackwater lawsuit accuses ex-employee of stealing secrets”
Bill Sizemore, The Virginian-Pilot, May 10, 2007
“Pivotal Family Lawsuit Against Blackwater USA Blocked from Court -- and Moved to Panel with Company Ties”, Amy Goodman, Democracy Now! May 23, 2007
“Blackwater lawsuit over U.S. security contractors killed in Iraq headed for private arbitration” Mike Baker, May 26, 2007
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June 27, 2007
February 9, 2007
Privatizing the War in Iraq
Guest Writer: L. Vincent Sebastian
This article summarizes some of the issues surrounding private armed forces involved in the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. It draws from the sources referenced at the end.
With the casualty count growing daily and troops stretched thin on the ground, the Bush administration is looking to mercenaries to help control Iraq. The practice of using mercenaries to fight wars is not new, but has become increasingly popular in recent years. During the first Gulf War, one out of every 50 to 60 soldiers on the battlefield was a mercenary. The number had climbed up to one in ten during the Bosnian conflict. Currently in Iraq, more than 40 percent of the total occupying force comprises private contractors. For President Bush and his political allies, war has become just another industry to be outsourced, with contractors providing a backdoor means of expanding the occupation through the deployment of private armies.
In his State of the Union address in last month, Bush mentioned a major new initiative in the U.S. disaster response/reconstruction/war machine: a Civilian Reserve Corps. Bush said: “Such a corps would function much like our military Reserve. It would ease the burden on the armed forces by allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when America needs them.” But this is precisely what the administration has already done, largely behind the backs of the American people and with little congressional input. Private contractors constitute the second-largest force in Iraq, about 100,000 strong, of which 48,000 work as private soldiers, according to a Government Accountability Office report. The number of private soldiers (armed security contractors) has more than doubled in the last two years, up from 20,000 in the first quarter of 2005. This is an undeclared expansion of the scope of the occupation.
This expansion is paid for with taxpayer dollars, of course. Obviously, the training of U.S. military personnel is paid for by our tax dollars. However, once skilled and experienced soldiers becomes eligible for discharge, private, for-profit corporations such as Blackwater USA (see footnote below) may recruit them away from the military, offering salaries much higher than those paid by the military. The average pay for a contractor on “active duty” is $500 to $600 a day, and may be as much as $1,000 a day, which is far more than that of military personnel. This is a strong incentive. One contractor said that he is regularly approached by far younger, low-paid U.S. servicemen, who ask about jobs at Blackwater.
The problem is that firms such a Blackwater rely primarily on large, taxpayer-funded U.S. government contracts to stay in business, not on the business of private sector customers or clients. Blackwater has a $300-million, no-bid contract (from 2003) with the State Department to guard diplomats in Iraq. Thus, tax dollars are used first to pay to train the troops, then to pay them a lot more to do basically the same job with a private contracting firm, and finally to pay hefty profits to the contracting firm.
While Blackwater is known in some quarters for its professionalism (it sees itself as the FedEx of defense and homeland security operations), the credentials of other firms are more questionable. Consider Aegis Defense Services, for example. Aegis was awarded a $293 million contract from the U.S. government to provide security in Iraq, despite the fact that its principal (Tim Spicer) was suspected of being involved in the 2004 coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea, for which his former business associate (Simon Mann) was convicted and sentenced to seven years in prison in Zimbabwe; and despite the fact that Aegis had no previous experience in Iraq and didn't have the resources to fulfill the contract. The controversial nature of this contract got the attention of Congress, and eventually the Pentagon admitted that its contracting officer was completely unaware of Spicer's background. Aegis’s first DOD audit in 2005 was damning, including the charge that the company was trying to ramp up so fast to meet the contract requirements they were hiring poorly vetted Iraqis and giving them passes to the Green Zone. The company also came under scrutiny when videos of Aegis contractors indiscriminately firing at civilian cars surfaced on the Internet. Despite this, Aegis continues to carry out extensive contracting operations in Iraq.
The role of private contractor personnel is ambiguous and controversial. Typically, they are bodyguards (for diplomats and other officials), or are armed guards hired to protect oil wells or to provide security for airports or along transportation corridors. These private soldiers have operated with almost no oversight or effective legal constraints. In the first years of the war, there were no rules limiting contractors’ use of force in Iraq. They could shoot to kill, but had little accountability. If contractors misbehaved – as they did at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison – they rarely faced charges. Why? Because private contractors are not legally considered combatants. Military law applies to the troops, but not to contractors, even though contractors are frequently in the same combat situations as the troops – where life and death decisions are made. The military can take disciplinary action and/or bring criminal charges against U.S. troops – but not against contractors – that break rules, regulations, and laws (including the Geneva Conventions) that govern troop conduct during times of war.
U.S. military officials have expressed concern about combat situations in which contractors open fire. Recently, the State Department imposed restrictions discouraging contractors from firing warning shots. As a consequence, private military firms have recently shifted their focused to “peacekeeping” duties (in part, to improve their image). But, there are still frequent reports of contractors running Iraqis off the road or injuring or killing innocent people. In carrying out their assignments, contractors can be very aggressive, offending locals and making enemies each time they go out (from a statement by retired Marine colonel T. X. Hammes). Ultimately, a contractor’s paid mission may not be fully consistent with that of the U.S. military, and may not support the broader interests of the U.S. counterinsurgency.
At the same time, the contractor’s work is as risky or riskier than that of the U.S. troops, and may make the jobs of both more difficult. The prospect of private armed security guards moving around combat zones adds a level of uncertainty and complexity for the troops (“Is that SUV coming toward us friend or foe?”). On many occasions, contractors have been fired upon by U.S. soldiers and Marines at checkpoints. Contractors are also targets for insurgents and militia in Iraq, as seen in early 2004 when four Blackwater employees were ambushed and burned in the Sunni hotbed of Fallouja. Multiple execution-style killings of contractors have taken place since then, the most recent just hours before Bush’s State of the Union address last month.
As the number of U.S. (and coalition) troop deaths rises, contractor deaths go uncounted in the official toll. The non-counting of contractors is certainly politically expedient since the official number hides some of the human costs of war. As of the first quarter of 2005, there were an estimated 240 deaths among some 20,000 armed private security contractors in Iraq. This number was not obtained from military sources, but from the Department of Labor (through Freedom of Information Act requests), which tracks the number of contractors that have been killed because the federal government has a program to insure contractors who service the US military abroad (an outgrowth of the Defense Base Act). More than 600 families of contractors in Iraq have filed for these benefits. Contractor firms such as Blackwater are under no obligation to make public the identities of those killed or details of the deaths.
Yet, 240 deaths (as of early 2005) is an underestimate of true number of contractors killed because it accounts for only contractors that are eligible for federal benefits inside the United States. Many of the 48,000 U.S.-funded mercenaries in Iraq are not Americans, and their deaths are not tracked by the Labor Department.
Blackwater and other U.S.-based military contractors have created a private military melting pot by hiring not only Americans, but also mercenaries from Bosnia, Chile, Colombia, the Filipeans, and South Africa. Many of these soldiers-for-hire are veterans of repressive military regimes, including that of the former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet and South Africa’s former apartheid government. Other recruits are impoverished former military personnel desperate for a paying job (Blackwater has a recruitment center in the Philippines).
Foreign mercenaries are typically paid much less than their American counterparts. One firm pays Filipino mercenaries $60,000-$80,000 a year, half of what it pays American mercenaries with equivalent qualifications and for the same assignments (although this is still more than the salaries of most active duty U.S. military personnel).
But it is ultimately the U.S. taxpayer who foots the bill, as illustrated by the following scenario reported by Sonni Efron with comments from Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-Ill.) (Los Angeles Times, July 2005). The U.S. government has funded “Plan Colombia”, a counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics program that includes training and support for the Colombian police and military. We have been training foreign nationals – who then take that training and market it to private companies, who pay them three or four times as much as we are paying soldiers. American taxpayers are paying for the training of those Colombian soldiers. When they leave to take more lucrative jobs, perhaps with an American military contractor, they take that training with them. So then we are paying to train that person's replacement. And then we are paying the bill to the private military contractors.
The fact that U.S. firms recruit foreign nationals does not sit well with their home countries. South Africa’s Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act prohibits South African citizens from direct participation as a combatant in armed conflict for private gain. Michelle Bachelet, Chile's defense minister, has ordered an investigation into whether such recruitment is legal under Chilean laws. And, Blackwater's recruitment activities in the Philippines have triggered severe criticism and massive protests there.
* Footnote: Blackwater USA has a 6,000 acre para-military training facility as part of its corporate headquarters, in Moyock, North Carolina, just south of the Virginia border. This training center was founded in 1996 to fulfill the “anticipated demand” for government outsourcing of firearms and related security training. Blackwater has trained more than 50,000 military and law enforcement personnel. The firm also has additional offices in Baghdad, Iraq, and Kuwait City, Kuwait.
Sources:
Bill Berkowitz, “Mercenaries ‘R’ Us”, AlterNet, March 24, 2004.
Amy Goodman, “Our mercenaries in Iraq: Interview with Jeremy Scahill”, Democracy Now! January 26th, 2007.
Mark Hemingway, “Warriors for Hire: Blackwater USA and the rise of private military contractors”, Weekly Standard, v. 012(14), December 18, 2006.
Jeremy Scahill, “Our mercenaries in Iraq” Op Ed, Los Angeles Times, January 25, 2007.
Sourcewatch: A project of the Center for Media & Democracy
Ann Scott Tyson, “Private Security Workers Living On Edge in Iraq”, Washington Post, April 23, 2005.
Photo credits:
Private Security Near Landcruiser
Blackwater USA Helicopter: Agence France Presse—Getty Images.
This article summarizes some of the issues surrounding private armed forces involved in the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. It draws from the sources referenced at the end.
With the casualty count growing daily and troops stretched thin on the ground, the Bush administration is looking to mercenaries to help control Iraq. The practice of using mercenaries to fight wars is not new, but has become increasingly popular in recent years. During the first Gulf War, one out of every 50 to 60 soldiers on the battlefield was a mercenary. The number had climbed up to one in ten during the Bosnian conflict. Currently in Iraq, more than 40 percent of the total occupying force comprises private contractors. For President Bush and his political allies, war has become just another industry to be outsourced, with contractors providing a backdoor means of expanding the occupation through the deployment of private armies.In his State of the Union address in last month, Bush mentioned a major new initiative in the U.S. disaster response/reconstruction/war machine: a Civilian Reserve Corps. Bush said: “Such a corps would function much like our military Reserve. It would ease the burden on the armed forces by allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when America needs them.” But this is precisely what the administration has already done, largely behind the backs of the American people and with little congressional input. Private contractors constitute the second-largest force in Iraq, about 100,000 strong, of which 48,000 work as private soldiers, according to a Government Accountability Office report. The number of private soldiers (armed security contractors) has more than doubled in the last two years, up from 20,000 in the first quarter of 2005. This is an undeclared expansion of the scope of the occupation.
This expansion is paid for with taxpayer dollars, of course. Obviously, the training of U.S. military personnel is paid for by our tax dollars. However, once skilled and experienced soldiers becomes eligible for discharge, private, for-profit corporations such as Blackwater USA (see footnote below) may recruit them away from the military, offering salaries much higher than those paid by the military. The average pay for a contractor on “active duty” is $500 to $600 a day, and may be as much as $1,000 a day, which is far more than that of military personnel. This is a strong incentive. One contractor said that he is regularly approached by far younger, low-paid U.S. servicemen, who ask about jobs at Blackwater.The problem is that firms such a Blackwater rely primarily on large, taxpayer-funded U.S. government contracts to stay in business, not on the business of private sector customers or clients. Blackwater has a $300-million, no-bid contract (from 2003) with the State Department to guard diplomats in Iraq. Thus, tax dollars are used first to pay to train the troops, then to pay them a lot more to do basically the same job with a private contracting firm, and finally to pay hefty profits to the contracting firm.
While Blackwater is known in some quarters for its professionalism (it sees itself as the FedEx of defense and homeland security operations), the credentials of other firms are more questionable. Consider Aegis Defense Services, for example. Aegis was awarded a $293 million contract from the U.S. government to provide security in Iraq, despite the fact that its principal (Tim Spicer) was suspected of being involved in the 2004 coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea, for which his former business associate (Simon Mann) was convicted and sentenced to seven years in prison in Zimbabwe; and despite the fact that Aegis had no previous experience in Iraq and didn't have the resources to fulfill the contract. The controversial nature of this contract got the attention of Congress, and eventually the Pentagon admitted that its contracting officer was completely unaware of Spicer's background. Aegis’s first DOD audit in 2005 was damning, including the charge that the company was trying to ramp up so fast to meet the contract requirements they were hiring poorly vetted Iraqis and giving them passes to the Green Zone. The company also came under scrutiny when videos of Aegis contractors indiscriminately firing at civilian cars surfaced on the Internet. Despite this, Aegis continues to carry out extensive contracting operations in Iraq.
The role of private contractor personnel is ambiguous and controversial. Typically, they are bodyguards (for diplomats and other officials), or are armed guards hired to protect oil wells or to provide security for airports or along transportation corridors. These private soldiers have operated with almost no oversight or effective legal constraints. In the first years of the war, there were no rules limiting contractors’ use of force in Iraq. They could shoot to kill, but had little accountability. If contractors misbehaved – as they did at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison – they rarely faced charges. Why? Because private contractors are not legally considered combatants. Military law applies to the troops, but not to contractors, even though contractors are frequently in the same combat situations as the troops – where life and death decisions are made. The military can take disciplinary action and/or bring criminal charges against U.S. troops – but not against contractors – that break rules, regulations, and laws (including the Geneva Conventions) that govern troop conduct during times of war.
U.S. military officials have expressed concern about combat situations in which contractors open fire. Recently, the State Department imposed restrictions discouraging contractors from firing warning shots. As a consequence, private military firms have recently shifted their focused to “peacekeeping” duties (in part, to improve their image). But, there are still frequent reports of contractors running Iraqis off the road or injuring or killing innocent people. In carrying out their assignments, contractors can be very aggressive, offending locals and making enemies each time they go out (from a statement by retired Marine colonel T. X. Hammes). Ultimately, a contractor’s paid mission may not be fully consistent with that of the U.S. military, and may not support the broader interests of the U.S. counterinsurgency.
At the same time, the contractor’s work is as risky or riskier than that of the U.S. troops, and may make the jobs of both more difficult. The prospect of private armed security guards moving around combat zones adds a level of uncertainty and complexity for the troops (“Is that SUV coming toward us friend or foe?”). On many occasions, contractors have been fired upon by U.S. soldiers and Marines at checkpoints. Contractors are also targets for insurgents and militia in Iraq, as seen in early 2004 when four Blackwater employees were ambushed and burned in the Sunni hotbed of Fallouja. Multiple execution-style killings of contractors have taken place since then, the most recent just hours before Bush’s State of the Union address last month.
As the number of U.S. (and coalition) troop deaths rises, contractor deaths go uncounted in the official toll. The non-counting of contractors is certainly politically expedient since the official number hides some of the human costs of war. As of the first quarter of 2005, there were an estimated 240 deaths among some 20,000 armed private security contractors in Iraq. This number was not obtained from military sources, but from the Department of Labor (through Freedom of Information Act requests), which tracks the number of contractors that have been killed because the federal government has a program to insure contractors who service the US military abroad (an outgrowth of the Defense Base Act). More than 600 families of contractors in Iraq have filed for these benefits. Contractor firms such as Blackwater are under no obligation to make public the identities of those killed or details of the deaths.
Yet, 240 deaths (as of early 2005) is an underestimate of true number of contractors killed because it accounts for only contractors that are eligible for federal benefits inside the United States. Many of the 48,000 U.S.-funded mercenaries in Iraq are not Americans, and their deaths are not tracked by the Labor Department.
Blackwater and other U.S.-based military contractors have created a private military melting pot by hiring not only Americans, but also mercenaries from Bosnia, Chile, Colombia, the Filipeans, and South Africa. Many of these soldiers-for-hire are veterans of repressive military regimes, including that of the former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet and South Africa’s former apartheid government. Other recruits are impoverished former military personnel desperate for a paying job (Blackwater has a recruitment center in the Philippines).
Foreign mercenaries are typically paid much less than their American counterparts. One firm pays Filipino mercenaries $60,000-$80,000 a year, half of what it pays American mercenaries with equivalent qualifications and for the same assignments (although this is still more than the salaries of most active duty U.S. military personnel).
But it is ultimately the U.S. taxpayer who foots the bill, as illustrated by the following scenario reported by Sonni Efron with comments from Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-Ill.) (Los Angeles Times, July 2005). The U.S. government has funded “Plan Colombia”, a counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics program that includes training and support for the Colombian police and military. We have been training foreign nationals – who then take that training and market it to private companies, who pay them three or four times as much as we are paying soldiers. American taxpayers are paying for the training of those Colombian soldiers. When they leave to take more lucrative jobs, perhaps with an American military contractor, they take that training with them. So then we are paying to train that person's replacement. And then we are paying the bill to the private military contractors.
The fact that U.S. firms recruit foreign nationals does not sit well with their home countries. South Africa’s Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act prohibits South African citizens from direct participation as a combatant in armed conflict for private gain. Michelle Bachelet, Chile's defense minister, has ordered an investigation into whether such recruitment is legal under Chilean laws. And, Blackwater's recruitment activities in the Philippines have triggered severe criticism and massive protests there.
* Footnote: Blackwater USA has a 6,000 acre para-military training facility as part of its corporate headquarters, in Moyock, North Carolina, just south of the Virginia border. This training center was founded in 1996 to fulfill the “anticipated demand” for government outsourcing of firearms and related security training. Blackwater has trained more than 50,000 military and law enforcement personnel. The firm also has additional offices in Baghdad, Iraq, and Kuwait City, Kuwait.
Sources:
Bill Berkowitz, “Mercenaries ‘R’ Us”, AlterNet, March 24, 2004.
Amy Goodman, “Our mercenaries in Iraq: Interview with Jeremy Scahill”, Democracy Now! January 26th, 2007.
Mark Hemingway, “Warriors for Hire: Blackwater USA and the rise of private military contractors”, Weekly Standard, v. 012(14), December 18, 2006.
Jeremy Scahill, “Our mercenaries in Iraq” Op Ed, Los Angeles Times, January 25, 2007.
Sourcewatch: A project of the Center for Media & Democracy
Ann Scott Tyson, “Private Security Workers Living On Edge in Iraq”, Washington Post, April 23, 2005.
Photo credits:
Private Security Near Landcruiser
Blackwater USA Helicopter: Agence France Presse—Getty Images.
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September 25, 2007
Flagship Contractor Sinking in Blackwater
Guest Writer: L. Vincent Sebastian
Dateline: September 19, 2007
For the third day in a row, the controversy surrounding Blackwater security guards in Iraq is headline news. Last Sunday, the Blackwater guards of a State Department motorcade allegedly killed as many as 20 Iraqi civilians in a firefight with armed insurgents in Baghdad [1]. In response, the Iraqi government suspended Blackwater's license to work in Iraq and has ordered a full investigation of the incident.
This might seem like just another violent episode in the chaos that is Baghdad, but it is much more significant. Secretary of State Condolleezza Rice has been pressuring Prime Minister Maliki to return Blackwater's license, and President Bush himself plans to weigh in on the issue when he meets with Maliki next Tuesday. The revocation of Blackwater's license is fundamentally unacceptable to the Bush administration because it represents a setback in the achievement of their goal of a huge ramp-up in the U.S. private military force, as openly stated by Dick Cheney and other neocons formerly in the administration. The removal of a private security
contractor is not a precedent Bush & company would like to see set. Blackwater, as one of the largest and the most prominent of 28 contractors working in the region, is something of a flagship. The public's perception of Blackwater will be a strong indicator of the public's support for a privatized military.
Editor's Notes:
1. By some accounts there weren't "armed insurgents" shooting at the motorcade.
2. According to DemocracyNow!, Sept. 21, 2007, there is no "license" to be revoked.
A more grave issue being exposed by this controversy is that the US has become dependent on the military contractors. Peace movement activists might consider focusing energy on removing contractors from Iraq to undermine the viability of the occupation.
Dateline: September 19, 2007
For the third day in a row, the controversy surrounding Blackwater security guards in Iraq is headline news. Last Sunday, the Blackwater guards of a State Department motorcade allegedly killed as many as 20 Iraqi civilians in a firefight with armed insurgents in Baghdad [1]. In response, the Iraqi government suspended Blackwater's license to work in Iraq and has ordered a full investigation of the incident.
This might seem like just another violent episode in the chaos that is Baghdad, but it is much more significant. Secretary of State Condolleezza Rice has been pressuring Prime Minister Maliki to return Blackwater's license, and President Bush himself plans to weigh in on the issue when he meets with Maliki next Tuesday. The revocation of Blackwater's license is fundamentally unacceptable to the Bush administration because it represents a setback in the achievement of their goal of a huge ramp-up in the U.S. private military force, as openly stated by Dick Cheney and other neocons formerly in the administration. The removal of a private security
contractor is not a precedent Bush & company would like to see set. Blackwater, as one of the largest and the most prominent of 28 contractors working in the region, is something of a flagship. The public's perception of Blackwater will be a strong indicator of the public's support for a privatized military.
Editor's Notes:
1. By some accounts there weren't "armed insurgents" shooting at the motorcade.
2. According to DemocracyNow!, Sept. 21, 2007, there is no "license" to be revoked.
A more grave issue being exposed by this controversy is that the US has become dependent on the military contractors. Peace movement activists might consider focusing energy on removing contractors from Iraq to undermine the viability of the occupation.
Labels:
Blackwater,
Iraq,
military contractors,
private,
security
June 29, 2007
Blackwater Trying to Gain Popular Appeal
The Spy Who Billed Me blog shares with us that Blackwater is now a NASCAR sponsor.
Blackwater is owned and operated by a christian fundamentalist ideologue (Erik D. Prince). Their stock in trade is the use of force, or they might say managing the risk of violence. Actually, it's both.
Blackwater has major contracts with the State Department and other federal agencies to provide security. What happens when there's a contract dispute? Are the contractors going to be more loyal to the agency they work for or to the contract? Who is their ultimate boss, the President of the United States or the CEO of Blackwater?
Well-paid federal employees, or members of the US military, they are far more likely to be loyal to the mission. The commercialization of our security forces is an unacceptable security risk.
Blackwater, and firms like it, are accumulating wealth and power. We need to stop them before they have the influence to force the hand of Congress. The sponsorship of NASCAR by Blackwater is an indication that they are trying to gain popular appeal in mainstream culture. We need to act before they gain un-stoppable momentum.
Blackwater is owned and operated by a christian fundamentalist ideologue (Erik D. Prince). Their stock in trade is the use of force, or they might say managing the risk of violence. Actually, it's both.
Blackwater has major contracts with the State Department and other federal agencies to provide security. What happens when there's a contract dispute? Are the contractors going to be more loyal to the agency they work for or to the contract? Who is their ultimate boss, the President of the United States or the CEO of Blackwater?
Well-paid federal employees, or members of the US military, they are far more likely to be loyal to the mission. The commercialization of our security forces is an unacceptable security risk.
Blackwater, and firms like it, are accumulating wealth and power. We need to stop them before they have the influence to force the hand of Congress. The sponsorship of NASCAR by Blackwater is an indication that they are trying to gain popular appeal in mainstream culture. We need to act before they gain un-stoppable momentum.
Labels:
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September 8, 2007
Blackwater Grows as Support for Iraq War Shrinks
Guest Writer: L. Vincent Sebastian
With each passing month, more and more Americans are finding the Iraq war unacceptable and are calling for near-term troop redeployment and withdrawal. As for political progress in Iraq, the recent report of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) report said the Iraqi government has failed to meet 11 of 18 benchmarks set by the U.S. Congress earlier in the year, and has only partially met another four benchmarks. On the military side, the "surge" has had only mixed results and violence continues in most parts of the country. The widely anticipated report by Gen. Petraeus later this month will be mixed as well, giving both sides of the debate plenty of reasons to stick to their positions.
Against this backdrop of civil war in Iraq and political stalemate here at home, the private military contractor Blackwater is quietly expanding outward from its 7,000-acre headquarters in Moyock, North Carolina. Blackwater now has two new facilities in the works: a newly completed 80-acre compound in Mount Carroll, Illinois, and plans for an 800-acre facility in the hills outside San Diego, California. Groups of concerned citizens such as Blackwater Watch and Clearwater are keeping an eye on, and in some cases protesting, this expansion.
As Blackwater expands its geographic footprint, it is also growing the list of services it offers. The most recent new service is its training class to prepare law enforcement officers to handle active shooters such as the one who killed 32 people at Virginia Tech. This five-day session will put trainees into simulated scenarios at a mock high school. While special tactical units such as SWAT teams are often part of large domestic law enforcement agencies, the direct involvement of a private military contractor in the training of police here at home is cause for concern. It blurs the line between our domestic police and our national defense, and unfortunately puts us one step closer to a militarized home front.
Sources:
The Virginian-Pilot, "Others not so neighborly to Blackwater as North Carolina", by JOANNE KIMBERLIN, , August 26, 2007.
Associated Press, "Blackwater Offers Classes to Combat Active Shooters", by MIKE BAKER, August 27, 2007.
CLICK for Related Pieces by L. V. Sebastian
With each passing month, more and more Americans are finding the Iraq war unacceptable and are calling for near-term troop redeployment and withdrawal. As for political progress in Iraq, the recent report of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) report said the Iraqi government has failed to meet 11 of 18 benchmarks set by the U.S. Congress earlier in the year, and has only partially met another four benchmarks. On the military side, the "surge" has had only mixed results and violence continues in most parts of the country. The widely anticipated report by Gen. Petraeus later this month will be mixed as well, giving both sides of the debate plenty of reasons to stick to their positions.
Against this backdrop of civil war in Iraq and political stalemate here at home, the private military contractor Blackwater is quietly expanding outward from its 7,000-acre headquarters in Moyock, North Carolina. Blackwater now has two new facilities in the works: a newly completed 80-acre compound in Mount Carroll, Illinois, and plans for an 800-acre facility in the hills outside San Diego, California. Groups of concerned citizens such as Blackwater Watch and Clearwater are keeping an eye on, and in some cases protesting, this expansion.
As Blackwater expands its geographic footprint, it is also growing the list of services it offers. The most recent new service is its training class to prepare law enforcement officers to handle active shooters such as the one who killed 32 people at Virginia Tech. This five-day session will put trainees into simulated scenarios at a mock high school. While special tactical units such as SWAT teams are often part of large domestic law enforcement agencies, the direct involvement of a private military contractor in the training of police here at home is cause for concern. It blurs the line between our domestic police and our national defense, and unfortunately puts us one step closer to a militarized home front.
Sources:
The Virginian-Pilot, "Others not so neighborly to Blackwater as North Carolina", by JOANNE KIMBERLIN, , August 26, 2007.
Associated Press, "Blackwater Offers Classes to Combat Active Shooters", by MIKE BAKER, August 27, 2007.
CLICK for Related Pieces by L. V. Sebastian
September 17, 2007
Privatized War is a Black(water) Box
Guest Writer L. Vincent Sebastian
The expansion of Blackwater USA to new locations in Illinois and California is a grave indicator that America is moving in the wrong direction with respect to private military and security contractors (See ~ Blackwater Grows as Support For Iraq Shrinks). The role of these contractors should shrink, not grow, due to a number of legal and moral problems.
Some of the controversies surrounding Blackwater and other private contractors have been covered here previously this year (see - June 26; March 11 (3-Part Series); and February 9). And today, controversy erupted anew when the Iraqi government ordered Blackwater to leave the country after the fatal shooting of eight Iraqi civilians following a car bomb attack against a State Department convoy (see "Iraq expels American security firm" by Robert H. Reid, Associated Press, September 17, 2007).
Questioned in response to this incident, American officials refused to explain the legal authority under which Blackwater operates in Iraq or say whether the company was complying with an order. The real problem here is one of accountability: Private security contractors operating on foreign soil are not really accountable to anyone. By and large, they operate beyond the control of U.S. military and are not subject to military law. At the same time, they have immunity from Iraqi law (akin to diplomatic immunity). Apparently, the only thing holding a contractor in check is the prospect that its client (the State Department in this case) will be dissatisfied and not renew its contract. But in the insider game of no-bid government contracts, how likely is this for the politically connected Blackwater?
Ultimately, the biggest problem with private contractors is a moral one that affects us all. As war becomes increasingly privatized (about 129,000 contractors are currently operating in Iraq), it becomes further removed and concealed from the attention of the American people. The historic role of our government as the legitimate perpetrator of a war shifts to one of manager-at-arms-length of a war carried out by third parties, the contractors. This further distances us, the public, from the war and its consequences, and separates us from the sense of buy-in, participation, oversight, and responsibility we all must have if war is to be waged.
The expansion of Blackwater USA to new locations in Illinois and California is a grave indicator that America is moving in the wrong direction with respect to private military and security contractors (See ~ Blackwater Grows as Support For Iraq Shrinks). The role of these contractors should shrink, not grow, due to a number of legal and moral problems.
Some of the controversies surrounding Blackwater and other private contractors have been covered here previously this year (see - June 26; March 11 (3-Part Series); and February 9). And today, controversy erupted anew when the Iraqi government ordered Blackwater to leave the country after the fatal shooting of eight Iraqi civilians following a car bomb attack against a State Department convoy (see "Iraq expels American security firm" by Robert H. Reid, Associated Press, September 17, 2007).
Questioned in response to this incident, American officials refused to explain the legal authority under which Blackwater operates in Iraq or say whether the company was complying with an order. The real problem here is one of accountability: Private security contractors operating on foreign soil are not really accountable to anyone. By and large, they operate beyond the control of U.S. military and are not subject to military law. At the same time, they have immunity from Iraqi law (akin to diplomatic immunity). Apparently, the only thing holding a contractor in check is the prospect that its client (the State Department in this case) will be dissatisfied and not renew its contract. But in the insider game of no-bid government contracts, how likely is this for the politically connected Blackwater?
Ultimately, the biggest problem with private contractors is a moral one that affects us all. As war becomes increasingly privatized (about 129,000 contractors are currently operating in Iraq), it becomes further removed and concealed from the attention of the American people. The historic role of our government as the legitimate perpetrator of a war shifts to one of manager-at-arms-length of a war carried out by third parties, the contractors. This further distances us, the public, from the war and its consequences, and separates us from the sense of buy-in, participation, oversight, and responsibility we all must have if war is to be waged.
Labels:
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Blackwater License to be Revoked
Breaking News:
Iraqi Government is going to revoke the license for Blackwater USA to operate in Iraq. According to the Associated Press:
Sources:
"Blackwater license being revoked in Iraq,"Associated Press, Sept. 17, 2007, BASSEM MROUE.
Iraqi Government is going to revoke the license for Blackwater USA to operate in Iraq. According to the Associated Press:
The Iraqi government said Monday that it was revoking the license of an American security firm accused of involvement in the deaths of eight civilians in a firefight that followed a car bomb explosion near a State Department motorcade.
Interior Ministry spokesman Abdul-Karim Khalaf said eight civilians were killed and 13 were wounded when contractors believed to be working for Blackwater USA opened fire in a predominantly Sunni neighborhood of western Baghdad.
"We have canceled the license of Blackwater and prevented them from working all over Iraqi territory. We will also refer those involved to Iraqi judicial authorities."
Sources:
"Blackwater license being revoked in Iraq,"Associated Press, Sept. 17, 2007, BASSEM MROUE.
October 28, 2007
Blackwater Security Personnel: Illegal Combatants
George Bush has opened a can of worms. Although the worms might die, with a future rejection of the phrase "illegal enemy combatant" by the World community, it could now be applied to Blackwater USA personnel. Some might call that a backfire.
I'd be very anxious if I was a Blackwater operative going into a South American country under their new contract to fight drug trade (read "do the bidding of northern corporations".) The Village Voice reports:
In short, Blackwater personnel aren't covered by military law, and they aren't covered by local law in the nation of operations; they're currently illegal combatants. True, there's a scramble on to get them covered by some type of law, and the Democratic Congress seems all too happy to accommodate them (idiots missing an opportunity to nail this coffin). But for the time being, unless Congress votes them retroactive immunity, they are illegal, i.e., outside of the law.
I'd be very anxious if I was a Blackwater operative going into a South American country under their new contract to fight drug trade (read "do the bidding of northern corporations".) The Village Voice reports:
In a major new outsourcing deal reported by only a few outlets, including the Army Times, Blackwater will divvy up a $15 billion pot of government gold, along with four huge defense contractors: Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and Arinc.
In short, Blackwater personnel aren't covered by military law, and they aren't covered by local law in the nation of operations; they're currently illegal combatants. True, there's a scramble on to get them covered by some type of law, and the Democratic Congress seems all too happy to accommodate them (idiots missing an opportunity to nail this coffin). But for the time being, unless Congress votes them retroactive immunity, they are illegal, i.e., outside of the law.
October 25, 2007
Blackwater Tax Investigation
Guest Writer: L. Vincent Sebastian
Senator Kerry (D-Mass.) has joined Representative Waxman in calling for Blackwater tax investigation. "Blackwater is hiding behind the Bush administration to explain why they bilked the taxpayers out of millions of dollars," said the Massachusetts Democrat in a statement. "I intend to get to the bottom of this."
Sources:
Reuters, "Senator wants probe of Blackwater's tax practices", Kevin DrawbaughThu Oct 25, 2007
Senator Kerry (D-Mass.) has joined Representative Waxman in calling for Blackwater tax investigation. "Blackwater is hiding behind the Bush administration to explain why they bilked the taxpayers out of millions of dollars," said the Massachusetts Democrat in a statement. "I intend to get to the bottom of this."
Sources:
Reuters, "Senator wants probe of Blackwater's tax practices", Kevin DrawbaughThu Oct 25, 2007
September 18, 2007
Would Blackwater Get Away with that in America?
Reacting to the most recent killing of civilians by Blackwater USA in Iraq, Baghdad resident Halim Mashkoor told AP Television News:
Yes. It happend with Blackwater in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.
Sources:
Diplomatic convoys curtailed in Iraq, Associated Press, September 18, 2007.
Overkill: Feared Blackwater Mercenaries Deploy in New Orleans, DemocracyNow, September 12th, 2005.
"We see the security firms ... doing whatever they want in the streets. They beat citizens and scorn them..." "If such a thing happened in America or Britain, would the American president or American citizens accept it?"
Yes. It happend with Blackwater in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.
Sources:
Diplomatic convoys curtailed in Iraq, Associated Press, September 18, 2007.
Overkill: Feared Blackwater Mercenaries Deploy in New Orleans, DemocracyNow, September 12th, 2005.
Labels:
Blackwater,
civilians,
Iraq,
new orleans,
State Department
January 29, 2009
Iraq Gains Independence, Speaks Mind on Blackwater
The planets have aligned and now Iraq won't allow Blackwater to operate in country. The planets: The Bush goon squad pressure tactics are gone, the consciousness is high due in great part to Jeremy Scahill's book [1], Blackwater's hubris reached a peak in the unprovoked Nassor Square killing 17 people, Iraqi is finding it's sovereign voice.
All good news. But the reality is that the inertia of Bush's post-911 unleashing of the security industrial complex is force that will take generations to reverse. People trained to fire fully automatic weapons from speeding vehicles don't forget their skills, and yearn to use them. Hoards of wealth are still controlled in many private hands willing to pay for private armies. Mutual fears among rivals with private security forces feeds private army and arms races (Look at Mexico for example).
We need to build on this little victory to slowly roll back the growth of the private security state of the world.
Psssst... Do Something
- Contact the Broadcast Media
- Contact the Newspapers
- Contact the US Senate
- Contact the House of Representatives
Sources:
1. Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army.
Labels:
Army,
Blackwater,
Iraq,
Jeremy Scahill,
mercinary,
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security
October 8, 2007
Blackwater: A Growing Absurdity
Oct. 5, 2007
Guest Writer: L. Vincent Sebastian
The latest in the Blackwater brouhaha over the killing of [at least] 13 Iraqi civilians is that Condi Rice is ordering State Department in-house security agents to accompany Blackwater guards as they accompany State Department diplomats. But, if State Department security agents are now in the diplomat's convoy, why is Blackwater needed? Federal agents should not have to baby-sit redundant $500-a-day "cowboy" contractors in a hostile war zone.
The good news is that the House just passed legislation that would place all private government contractors in Iraq under U.S. criminal statutes. However, staunch resistance can be expected as the bill makes its way through the Senate and then a conference committee if it gets that far. We'll see what comes out the other end.
Guest Writer: L. Vincent Sebastian
The latest in the Blackwater brouhaha over the killing of [at least] 13 Iraqi civilians is that Condi Rice is ordering State Department in-house security agents to accompany Blackwater guards as they accompany State Department diplomats. But, if State Department security agents are now in the diplomat's convoy, why is Blackwater needed? Federal agents should not have to baby-sit redundant $500-a-day "cowboy" contractors in a hostile war zone.
The good news is that the House just passed legislation that would place all private government contractors in Iraq under U.S. criminal statutes. However, staunch resistance can be expected as the bill makes its way through the Senate and then a conference committee if it gets that far. We'll see what comes out the other end.
Labels:
Blackwater,
legislation,
military,
private,
State Department
February 23, 2007
What if George Bush Declared Martial Law?
Jane Smiley asks how could Bush actually subdue Americans if he were to declare Martial Law?:
Glad someone is asking. It's also good to see a very healthy response from readers, over 350 comments.
Some of the Comments:
Appropriately, the first comment was,
Then, someone pointed out the Blackwater brown shirts, Bush's pretorian gaurd:
Would the local authorities fall in line? Dissent? Split? Here's one prediction:
He's not the only one prepared:
And the requisite Orwell quote:
Some advice to dacoyle, you better plan ahead:
Buy that gun before the clampdown. MomMadonna did:
Then, there's the counter-intuitive thinker:
Maybe... we can hope. Then, there's the cynic dashing that hope:
Unforturnately, that sounds all too familiar to me, echoed with examples here:
You've probably heard what comes at the end of this too:
I guess this reader didn't take too kindly to Jane Smiley's sentiment that martial law under Bush would be a joke. Then there's someone who's better versed than they think:
Yes. Crack-down on a minority (Litz inserts: dark-skinned people, immigrants, hippies, war protestors, etc.). The joint task forces are getting plenty of practice conducting raids on the immigrants, recently in San Francisco.
Then there is the serious, honest conservative:
Nice to know that we've got conservatives on "our side." Then there's the pragmatic economic angle, there always is. But this time with an edge of dissent:
You go gro!
Here's a creepy one, in more than one way:
Then, there's the harsh reality of families further torn appart:
There's the person who has moved out of the US because of Bush, the person who has noticed the MSM's ratcheted rhetoric on al-Qaida
Then, there's the hope of a military coup... against Bush:
Probably shouldn't pin too much on hope.
These are the highlights from only two of fifteen pages of comments.
Update:
According to a post on Slashdot entitled Bush Signs Bill Enabling Martial Law a revision of the Insurrection Act (10 U.S.C.331 -335) gives Bush new authorities that may override the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C.1385). The Posse Comitatus Act places strict prohibitions on military involvement in domestic law enforcement.
See more from Frank Morales piece, October 26, 2006, that appeared on the Toward Freedom web site.
That would be praetorian guard
~
One day, we were supposed to wake up, and martial law would be declared, and we were supposed to actually pay attention to it? Where are they keeping the troops who were going to patrol our neighborhoods? Who was it who was going to disarm the population? Who was their base going to be, when they sought public support for martial law? Who was going to round us up and where were they going to put us?
Glad someone is asking. It's also good to see a very healthy response from readers, over 350 comments.
Some of the Comments:
Appropriately, the first comment was,
"The first thing to go will be the internet." - elmcorners
Then, someone pointed out the Blackwater brown shirts, Bush's pretorian gaurd:
To address the question "where would the troops come from" since they're all in Iraq or sitting in their own shit at Walter Reed, this is where Blackwater comes in. Are there sufficient numbers to control the entire country..of course not. But, there are enough of these redneck, uneducated, testosterone ladden inbreeds to cause much disruption. - halsey
Would the local authorities fall in line? Dissent? Split? Here's one prediction:
Local police would gear up in their ski masks and military like outfits and await their leaders orders. I believe Americans, including myself, would take to the streets. - Michigan
He's not the only one prepared:
I've been expecting him to pull something like this since 2000. So has everyoe in my family. We're prepared. - vurz
And the requisite Orwell quote:
The lessons of Orwell's 1984 were not lost on the neocons: brook no dissent, suppress truth, use brutality and threat of torture, control the media; create a complete dissociation between reality and the approved myth of the Benevolent Leader. Put TVs everywhere.
So far, so good. - fairwitness
Some advice to dacoyle, you better plan ahead:
If Bush declared martial law, I would give thanks that my complaints about the NRA had come to nothing. Then I would go out and buy a gun. - dacoyle
Buy that gun before the clampdown. MomMadonna did:
This is why this peacenik woman has kept up her shooting skills and owns a personal arm. - MomMadonna
Then, there's the counter-intuitive thinker:
as bizarre as it sounds, maybe a declaration of martial law is precisely what it is going to take to finally shake our citizens out of their slumber and force these criminals from office... the white house occupants would be replaced in a matter of days...
Maybe... we can hope. Then, there's the cynic dashing that hope:
Those opposing Martial Law would sit around slinging abuse at those who support it, and vice versa. Ultimately you'd do nothing but moan a little before getting on with your lives.
You are American.
Unforturnately, that sounds all too familiar to me, echoed with examples here:
What would we do about it? Nothing, What have we done about the Patriot Act, eavesdropping, illegal detention of prisoners, the invasion of Iraq, the false justification behind the authorization for this war, the obvious build up of an imminent conflict with Iran?
You've probably heard what comes at the end of this too:
Well, let's see, they federalize the Nat'l Guard, the State Police, the country Sheriff, and the local police. They issue a curfew for 6pm with shoot to kill orders for anyone out after that time. Wow, that is funny. What's REALLY funny is what they did just before issuing the martial law order...cancel the 2008 elections. Hardy, har, har.
I guess this reader didn't take too kindly to Jane Smiley's sentiment that martial law under Bush would be a joke. Then there's someone who's better versed than they think:
I am not well versed on these things but it seems to me that the kind of martial law envisioned by BushCo is less a country-wide affair and more a targeted approach designed to stifle dissent of the kind we saw last year when immigrants took to the streets in massive numbers. - Litz
Yes. Crack-down on a minority (Litz inserts: dark-skinned people, immigrants, hippies, war protestors, etc.). The joint task forces are getting plenty of practice conducting raids on the immigrants, recently in San Francisco.
Then there is the serious, honest conservative:
What Would You Do If Bush Declared Martial Law?
I asked myself that very question last fall when I chose to reenlist rather then retire. I will submit my retirement papers as a form of protest. Other then that, I have not yet decided. I do believe every patriot ought to be considering their potential responses and preparing their resources to ensure they are free to act upon whichever decision they may make. - Radical Republican (Mike)
Nice to know that we've got conservatives on "our side." Then there's the pragmatic economic angle, there always is. But this time with an edge of dissent:
How disruptive to business would martial law be? Let's say that I wouldn't go shopping. here are lots of ways to express dissent besides protesting in the streets or signing petitions. How about slow downs? Just not pay the bills on time. I mean, to hell with the credit cards and playing 'good taxpayer'. - gro
You go gro!
Here's a creepy one, in more than one way:
Nothing is illegal to these thugs that currently have our nation in a choke hold. Who will round up the Americans, you ask? Speculation has it, it will be the literally millions of the south/central american/mexican paramilitary gangs that have inundated our country.
Then, there's the harsh reality of families further torn appart:
My Brother is in National Guard. He Informed me years ago,he thinks. We SHOULD be under Martial Law.
There's the person who has moved out of the US because of Bush, the person who has noticed the MSM's ratcheted rhetoric on al-Qaida
Then, there's the hope of a military coup... against Bush:
I too believe that the US military, by and large, would resist such obviously illegal orders.
Probably shouldn't pin too much on hope.
These are the highlights from only two of fifteen pages of comments.
Update:
According to a post on Slashdot entitled Bush Signs Bill Enabling Martial Law a revision of the Insurrection Act (10 U.S.C.331 -335) gives Bush new authorities that may override the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C.1385). The Posse Comitatus Act places strict prohibitions on military involvement in domestic law enforcement.
See more from Frank Morales piece, October 26, 2006, that appeared on the Toward Freedom web site.
That would be praetorian guard
~
November 17, 2007
Global Climate Change Accelerating
I'm debating with myself. Will George Bush go down in history as a war criminal or global climate change criminal? Perhaps both, but certainly the latter. People in the future might forget the wars, and Bush might escape prosecution on war crimes, but they will be living the global climate disaster.
When I read that scientists have concluded global warming is accelerating my thought was, "This means they are VERY certain about global warming." That comes from my physics background; detecting "acceleration" means you already know something about the velocity of the trend. By analogy, it's one thing to see a car is moving in a particular direction at some velocity, but it's more difficult to tell that it's picking up speed. Scientists have apparently confirmed the latter.
Bush's White House is just grasping the fact that the car is moving in the direction of climate change. I doubt they appreciate the fact that it's picking up speed.
The Associated Press writes, "Sharon Hays, a White House science official and head of the U.S. delegation, said the certainty of climate change was clearer now than when Bush rejected Kyoto." Hays said,
The AP adds, "but confidence in human responsibility had increased since then."
Yvo de Boer, the U.N.'s top climate change official, recently said,
To toss in another physics concept, the trend in global warming has inertia, which means, even if the foot is eased, the car will simply drop to a constant velocity (we'll keep getting warmer); even if the foot is taken off the gas pedal and the car slows down, it will keep going in the same direction (getting warmer); even if the brakes are applied, it will keep going in the same direction (getting warmer). Inertia.
Actually, the point about inertia isn't new, but it is news in the corporate media. This was known in the mid-1990s when I was grad school. There's a physical reason for it. As the earth warms, and the northern regions locked in permafrost get soggy, the frozen organic matter is subject to bacteria decay and gives off methane, a greenhouse gas that's at least ten-times as efficient as carbon dioxide in trapping solar radiation in the earth's changing atmosphere. As the earth warms, and permafrost melts, more of this gas is released, thereby generating more gas, leading to more warming in a positive feedback process. Inertia
In theory, this process could spin out of control, that is, lead to the "runaway greenhouse effect." It's called "runaway" because it runs away from human control to do anything about it. It could lead to the total demise of the Earth.
The sick reality is that the Bush crony capitalists, like Blackwater World Wide, are positioning themselves to profit from this emerging disaster. I've not read Naomi Klein's recent book on disaster capitalism, but I'd have to guess it touches on this topic. If not, her paperback version of The Shock Doctrine should.
Sources:
Associated Press, UN panel gives dire warming forecast, ARTHUR MAX, November 17, 2007.
When I read that scientists have concluded global warming is accelerating my thought was, "This means they are VERY certain about global warming." That comes from my physics background; detecting "acceleration" means you already know something about the velocity of the trend. By analogy, it's one thing to see a car is moving in a particular direction at some velocity, but it's more difficult to tell that it's picking up speed. Scientists have apparently confirmed the latter.
Bush's White House is just grasping the fact that the car is moving in the direction of climate change. I doubt they appreciate the fact that it's picking up speed.
The Associated Press writes, "Sharon Hays, a White House science official and head of the U.S. delegation, said the certainty of climate change was clearer now than when Bush rejected Kyoto." Hays said,
What's changed since 2001 is the scientific certainty that this is happening.... Back in 2001 the IPCC report said it is likely that humans were having an impact on the climate...
The AP adds, "but confidence in human responsibility had increased since then."
Yvo de Boer, the U.N.'s top climate change official, recently said,
What's new is the clarity of the signal, how clear the scientific message is ... "The politicians have no excuse not to act.
To toss in another physics concept, the trend in global warming has inertia, which means, even if the foot is eased, the car will simply drop to a constant velocity (we'll keep getting warmer); even if the foot is taken off the gas pedal and the car slows down, it will keep going in the same direction (getting warmer); even if the brakes are applied, it will keep going in the same direction (getting warmer). Inertia.
Actually, the point about inertia isn't new, but it is news in the corporate media. This was known in the mid-1990s when I was grad school. There's a physical reason for it. As the earth warms, and the northern regions locked in permafrost get soggy, the frozen organic matter is subject to bacteria decay and gives off methane, a greenhouse gas that's at least ten-times as efficient as carbon dioxide in trapping solar radiation in the earth's changing atmosphere. As the earth warms, and permafrost melts, more of this gas is released, thereby generating more gas, leading to more warming in a positive feedback process. Inertia
In theory, this process could spin out of control, that is, lead to the "runaway greenhouse effect." It's called "runaway" because it runs away from human control to do anything about it. It could lead to the total demise of the Earth.
The sick reality is that the Bush crony capitalists, like Blackwater World Wide, are positioning themselves to profit from this emerging disaster. I've not read Naomi Klein's recent book on disaster capitalism, but I'd have to guess it touches on this topic. If not, her paperback version of The Shock Doctrine should.
Sources:
Associated Press, UN panel gives dire warming forecast, ARTHUR MAX, November 17, 2007.
October 6, 2007
McGovern on National Security and the Reason Why we are Occupying Iraq
Thanks to the most crudely partisan decision in the history of the Supreme court, the nation has been given a President of painfully limited wisdom and compassion and lacking any sense of the nation's true greatness.
George McGovern began his essay, "The Reason Why," with these words in April 2003, soon after the start of the Iraq war. McGovern speaks with authority about war, having survived thirty-five combat missions over hostile Germany as the pilot of a B-24 bomber. Others were not so lucky. McGovern reflects on his friend Eddie Kendall:
Eddie was torn in half by a blast of shrapnel during the Battle of the Bulge - dead at age 19, during the opening days of the battle - the best baseball player and pheasant hunter I knew.
McGovern knows there is much more to "national security" than military might, a capacity that is now being questioned when it comes to the United States. James Galbraith notes:
Bush and Cheney have done more than bungle a war and damage the Army. They have destroyed the foundation of the post-Cold War world security system, which was the accepted authority of American military power. That reputation is now gone.
McGovern cites domestic examples of how Bush has undermined our national security, after noting the creation of the "costly and largely useless" Department of Homeland Security:
Meanwhile, such fundamental building blocks of national security as full employment and a strong labor movement are of no concern. The nearly $1.5 trillion tax giveaway, largely for the further enrichment of those already rich, will have to be made up by cutting government services and shifting a larger share of the tax burden to workers and the elderly.
He continues to cite other sources of civil discontent that undermine national security:
The same families who are exploited by a rich man's government find their sons and daughters being called to war... but not the sons of the rich and well connected.
The US debt is becoming insurmountable when you consider that the tax revenue base is diminishing because outsourced jobs are not going to return. Even former Treasury Secretary Robert Ruben has pondered that ideologues like Bush are weakening the US Government's financial capacity on purpose to increase the relative strength of private capital; they want less government, and they are making that a reality.
Unfortunately, in the process, the entire world economy is teetering on the edge as a result. It is sobering to think of the implications of the likely financial debacle that will result from Bush's policies, as old school economist John King has in a general way:
... if you persist in believing that Uncle Sam is going to bail you out, or anyone else out, forget it [Bush's policies of "less government" have made this even more true]. There is no insurance program that will ultimately return your money to your hands. Nor is there any prevention against the domestic social violence that will erupt when financial chaos descends.
It is this level of "national security" with which Bush is flirting, but he and the inside-crowd don't care. They will hide behind the security compounds and Blackwater bodyguards paid for with the largess accumulated over the last two terms of the Bush presidency... or so they think.
McGovern also addresses the role of God in all of this.
The President frequently confides to individuals and friendly audiences that he is guided by God's hand..... I most certainly don't see God at work in the slaughter and destruction now unfolding in Iraq or in the war plans now being developed for additional American invasions of other lands.
Seymour Hersh recently informs us of refined Pentagon plans to attack Iran, justified by unsubstantiated claims of Iranian military interference in Iraq. We teeter on a war that threatens to be spread by President Bush. People should not doubt that Iran can bring the war US shores if it chooses to do so; how difficult would it be to sneak into the vast US and plant bombs somewhere along the countless miles of US roads? If they hit military vehicles on US roads, that's not terrorism, it's war, a war the US started.
As to "The Reason Why" Bush is undermining our national security, McGovern, who was once an insider, sums it up:
Bush's motives have more to do with empire and profit than with liberating Iraq.
George McGovern was the US Senator of South Dakota from 1962 to 1980 and Democratic candidate for President in 1972. If South Dakota was a separate nation, it had enough nuclear missiles to have been ranked the third largest nuclear power during the cold war.
Sources:
The Reason Why, George McGovern, Nation Magazine, April 21, 2003.
Mother Jones Magazine, "Quitting Iraq won't undo the the war’s damage to U.S. security.", James K. Galbraith. March/April 2006.
Labels:
George Bush,
George McGovern,
national security,
Reason,
Why
June 29, 2008
US Kills with Impunity in Iraq... Again
Imagine if one of Vice President Dick Cheney's bodyguards was shot and killed during a Christmas party. Imagine that the trigger-man was known. Do you think it would be big news? Do you think the trigger-man would face some kind of court process? Certainly.But on Christmas Eve in 2006, a US contractor from Blackwater shot and killed a bodyguard of Iraqi Vice President Adil Abdul-Mahdi. Most Americans probably didn't hear about it in the corporate media and, as of recently, there has been no judicial process.
Now imagine if a relative of President George Bush was killed by a foreign military force conducting a security raid in the United States. Hard to imagine, eh? But the reverse has just happened in the Iraqi state of Karbala. We did hear about this recent incident as the news zipped by in the 24-hour news cycle a couple days ago...
Outraged Iraqi officials demanded an investigation into an early morning U.S. military raid Friday near the birthplace of Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki. The [Karbala] governor's brother, Hassanein al Khazaali, said late Friday that the Iraqi killed in the operation was a relative of the U.S.-backed prime minister.
How many times have we heard "demands for an investigation," to be conducted by the fox guarding the hen house (US military)? We rarely hear the results of these investigations, and if we do, they're usually like those of the Haditha Massacre. US Marines involved in Haditha have gotten away with venting their deadly rage on three unarmed college students and a cab driver happening by the site of a roadside bombing that killed a Marine. The Marines also entered two houses and killed most of the occupants, including women and children. By the end of their spree, the Marines had killed 24 apparently innocent Iraqis.
We're supposed to believe the Marines were just following standard procedures. If we take them at their word, the US "procedures" can lead to the massacre of 24 civilians, an incident that is probably more common than we'd like to believe [1]. These very destabilizing "standard procedures" are contrary to the stated "security" mission of the US. This chain of logic justifies the withdrawal of US military forces from Iraq, but you won't hear this analysis voiced in the elite media.
My point? High profile killings by US forces in Iraq go by with little news coverage (more examples below). Countless similar incidents occur without any comment. These killings would cease if the US would leave Iraq. Again, the logic is clear: The US government isn't a force of stability in Iraq, rather it is an arm of corporate colonialism, which is very destabilizing.
Sources:
McClatchy, Iraqi officials outraged by U.S. raid in prime minister's hometown, Hannah Allam and Sahar Issa.
[1] Given the size of Iraq, most incidents go unreported in the media. We get a glimpse into this by high-profile incidents that do make it into the mainstream, like the April 2003 US killing of journalists in the Palestine Hotel, and the US killing of a senior Italian intelligence official, Nicola Calipari, as he was helping evacuate Italian journalist Giuliana Sgrena who had been kidnapped in Iraq. Additional insight can be gained from the testimonials of US soldiers who spoke during the March 2008 Winter Soldier Hearings organized by Iraqi Veterans Against War.
Photo Credit: Relatives mourn near the bodies of children killed in a U.S. raid in Tikrit March 15, 2006. Eleven people, most of them women and children were killed when a house was bombed during a U.S. raid north of Baghdad, police and relatives said. (AP Photo/Bassim Daham).
July 1, 2007
Iraq for Sale and the US Powder Keg
I've owned Robert Greenwald's "Iraq for Sale: The War Profiteers"[1] for half a year. I finally watched it last night having resisted so long because I knew it would be a bummer. Actually, it was energizing in the sense that anger induces motivation.
The movie Sicko, by Michael Moore, thoroughly discredits the US health care system. It also exposes deep and wide corruption that is enriching an elite minority. That same establishment has cornered the US defense and security industries. US government officials are implicated and enriching themselves upon retirement from high office. The Democratic and Republican parties are corrupted by the wealth and power that has been consolidated via government largess.
Our hope lies in common people of all political persuasions who are harmed, even killed, by this corruption. There are more of us than the elite minority, and we live in a democracy where majority rules... at least the majority is supposed to rule.
The US political system that has enabled this corruption has lost nearly all legitimacy. You can be sure that the establishment knows this. In response, the power elite is establishing new laws that anticipate the need to clamp down on domestic dissent in the future. That impending need is summed up in the last segment of the film Iraq for Sale in which a relative of a former Blackwater employee says:
Michael Moore explains that the French people actually exercise democracy because they are well organized. He observes a difference in our countries; in the US, the people are afraid of their government. In France, the government is afraid of the people. [2]
The myth of the US democracy is being exposed as a fraud.
- Joan Baez
People now "see" and are grappling with what to do about the fact that American Revolution replaced the British aristocracy with an American aristocracy. The answer lies in one word, "organize."
Click Here for an "Action Guide" associated with Greenwald's film and links to organizations working for positive change. An "action" example of many is provided immediately below:
Take Action (Just one Example):
Army investigations implicated employees from Titan and CACI in the abuses of Iraqi detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad. To date, only one civilian contractor has faced charges. Write to the U.S. Department of Justice to act immediately to investigate and prosecute all cases of human rights abuses by civilian and corporate actors operating with seeming impunity in the “war on terror”. You can also write to the companies, like Titan, to express your concern over their human rights policies and practices. For both actions, go to Amnesty USA Action.
Sources:
1. Iraq for Sale: The War Profiteers, by Robert Greenwald.
2. PBS "NOW" with David Brancaccio, Michael Moore, on French vs Americans, June 29, 2007.
The movie Sicko, by Michael Moore, thoroughly discredits the US health care system. It also exposes deep and wide corruption that is enriching an elite minority. That same establishment has cornered the US defense and security industries. US government officials are implicated and enriching themselves upon retirement from high office. The Democratic and Republican parties are corrupted by the wealth and power that has been consolidated via government largess.
Our hope lies in common people of all political persuasions who are harmed, even killed, by this corruption. There are more of us than the elite minority, and we live in a democracy where majority rules... at least the majority is supposed to rule.
The US political system that has enabled this corruption has lost nearly all legitimacy. You can be sure that the establishment knows this. In response, the power elite is establishing new laws that anticipate the need to clamp down on domestic dissent in the future. That impending need is summed up in the last segment of the film Iraq for Sale in which a relative of a former Blackwater employee says:
You know, I love my Country.I stand behind it. I'm concerned now in a way that I've probably never been concerned before, because I don't like what I'm seeing. America has become a powder keg I think, and it's just waiting for a match.
Michael Moore explains that the French people actually exercise democracy because they are well organized. He observes a difference in our countries; in the US, the people are afraid of their government. In France, the government is afraid of the people. [2]
The people who have the money, the people making the profit, have a lot of power and a lot of money, and a lot of influence. And, so I think it will really take something big, a big movement here in the United States
The myth of the US democracy is being exposed as a fraud.
How many years can some people exist
Before they're allowed to be free
How many times can a man turn his head
And pretend that he just doesn't see
The answer, my friend, is blowing in the wind
The answer is blowing in the wind
- Joan Baez
People now "see" and are grappling with what to do about the fact that American Revolution replaced the British aristocracy with an American aristocracy. The answer lies in one word, "organize."
Click Here for an "Action Guide" associated with Greenwald's film and links to organizations working for positive change. An "action" example of many is provided immediately below:
Take Action (Just one Example):
Army investigations implicated employees from Titan and CACI in the abuses of Iraqi detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad. To date, only one civilian contractor has faced charges. Write to the U.S. Department of Justice to act immediately to investigate and prosecute all cases of human rights abuses by civilian and corporate actors operating with seeming impunity in the “war on terror”. You can also write to the companies, like Titan, to express your concern over their human rights policies and practices. For both actions, go to Amnesty USA Action.
Sources:
1. Iraq for Sale: The War Profiteers, by Robert Greenwald.
2. PBS "NOW" with David Brancaccio, Michael Moore, on French vs Americans, June 29, 2007.
Labels:
aristocracy,
Blackwater,
CACI,
David Brancaccio,
Iraq for Sale,
Michael Moore,
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Robert Greenwald,
Sicko,
Take Action,
Titan,
war
April 3, 2007
Davos Dilemma
Naomi Klein recently said,
According to DemocracyNow, "Naomi Klein recently spoke at an event in New York celebrating the launch of Jeremy Scahill's first book, "Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army." In her talk, Naomi Klein spoke about the privatization of the state."
Sources:
DemocracyNow, April 2, 2007, "The Worse Things Get in Iraq, the More Privatized This War Becomes, The More Profitable This War Becomes" - Naomi Klein on the Privatization of the State.
See Also:
The Problem with Privatizing War
www.blackwaterbook.com
.
There was a phrase that came out of the Davos conference this year. Every year, there’s always a big idea to emerge from the World Economic Summit in Davos. This year, the big idea was the Davos dilemma. Now, what is the Davos dilemma? The Davos dilemma is this: for decades, it's been conventional wisdom that generalized mayhem was a drain on the global economy, that you could have an individual shock or a crisis or a war that could be exploited for privatization, but on the whole -- and this was the Thomas Friedman thesis -- there needed to be stability in order to have steady economic growth; the Davos dilemma is that it's no longer true. You can have generalized mayhem, you can have wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, threats of nuclear war with Iran, a worsening of the Israeli occupation, a deepening of violence against Palestinians, you can have a terror in the face of global warming, you could have increased blowback from resource wars, you can have soaring oil prices, but, lo and behold, the stock market just goes up and up and up.
According to DemocracyNow, "Naomi Klein recently spoke at an event in New York celebrating the launch of Jeremy Scahill's first book, "Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army." In her talk, Naomi Klein spoke about the privatization of the state."
Sources:
DemocracyNow, April 2, 2007, "The Worse Things Get in Iraq, the More Privatized This War Becomes, The More Profitable This War Becomes" - Naomi Klein on the Privatization of the State.
See Also:
The Problem with Privatizing War
www.blackwaterbook.com
.
Labels:
Blackwater,
Davos,
dilemma,
Naomi Klein,
privatize,
war
March 15, 2007
Privatizing War - Part 3
Guest Writer: L. Vincent Sebastian
FINAL in a Three-Part Series,
My recent posting, “Privatizing the War in Iraq”, describes the Bush administration’s growing reliance on private contractors such as Blackwater USA to conduct military operations in Iraq. Yet, the issues and potential problems with private contractors described in that posting are only the tip of the iceberg. In the new posting below, the many problems surrounding private military firms (PMFs) are more fully laid out. The source material for this posting is: P.W. Singer, “Corporate Warriors: The Rise and Ramifications of the Privatized Military Industry”, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter 2001/2002. Although Singer’s article, turned into a book, was published before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, its relevance has only increased in the last five years.
Impacts of the Privatized Military Industry on Conflict, Security, and Public Policy
The likely consequences of PMF activities fall into three broad categories: contractual dilemmas; military market dynamics and disruptions on security relations; and the policy impact of PMFs as alternative military actors.
(1) Contractual Dilemmas. Three types of contractual dilemmas are considered: the financial bottom line; monitoring and oversight, and the dependences of states on PMFs.
(a) The Bottome Line. At issue here are divided loyalties and different goals. Clear tensions exist between the client's security objectives and the PMF’s desire to maximize profit, so that the public good and the PMF’s good often conflict. In spite of claims to the contrary, the PMF may not act only in its client’s best interests. Given that the PMF’s focus is on the bottom line, it may have an incentive to cut corners to increase profits. For example, during the Balkans conflict, Brown & Root (a subsidiary of Halliburton) is alleged to have failed to deliver or severely overcharged the U.S. Army on four out of seven of its contractual obligations. In addition, PMFs have similar financial incentives to prolong their contracts and to avoid taking undue risks that might endanger their own corporate assets. The result may be a protracted conflict that could have been avoided. Finally, it is no stretch to imagine two arms of a large PMF contracting to support opposing sides in a conflict.
(b) Monitoring and Oversight. Few clients have experience in contracting with PMFs, and frequently there is little oversight and/or a lack of clearly defined requirements. Add in the fog of war, and proper monitoring becomes extremely difficult. Moreover, the actual consumer may not be the contracting party. Some nation-states pay PMFs to supply personnel on their behalf to their allies or to international organizations. The accountability gap between the server and served is becomes much wider in such cases.
(c) Dependence. As the use of PMFs becomes increasingly popular, so too does the danger that clients will become overly dependent on PMF services. Reliance on PMFs means that the client’s strategic success is vulnerable to changes in market conditions and to the client-PMF balance of power. This can result in three potential risks to the client. First, the PMF might leave its client in the lurch. A PMF may have no compunction about suspending a contract if a situation becomes financially or physically too risky. Because they are typically based elsewhere, and in the absence of applicable international laws to enforce compliance, PMFs face no real risk of punishment if they defect from their contractual obligations. The employees of PMFs cannot be forced to stay at their posts in the face danger. To the extent that entire military functions such as weapons maintenance and supply have become privatized, the entire military machine would break down if even a modest number of PMF employees chose to leave.
Second, the PMF might gain dominance over the client. In weak or failed nation-states, PMFs, which are often the most powerful force on the local scene, may take steps to protect their own interests. Thus early termination of a contract, dissatisfaction with the terms of payment, or disagreements over specific orders could lead to unpleasant repercussions for a weak client. For example, it is suspected that in 1996 Executive Outcomes helped to oust the leader of Sierra Leone, who headed the very regime that had hired it, in favor of another local general with whom the firm’s executives had a better working relationship.
Third, the PMF might engage in economic imperialism. Clients of (type 1, military provider) PMFs are often those most in need but least able to pay and thus at the highest risk of default. This imbalance can lead to the mortgaging of valuable public assets to the PMF or its associates in an attempt to align the client’s and firm’s incentives. For example, the PMF may obtain mineral rights following the fulfillment of its contract, or possibly in exchange for protecting those very resources and their production. A variation of this is the client’s promise to pay the PMF in public resources or assets currently held by enemy forces, following a successful campaign. Ultimately, the result is that valuable resources for the nation as a whole are lost in order to meet short-term exigencies.
(2) Military Market Dynamics and Disruptions. Military market dynamics and disruptions can complicate international security because military powers are no longer exclusively sovereign states but include private players. The privatized military industry is an independent, globalized supplier operating beyond any one state’s domain. Non-state actors can access formidable military capabilities, and where state structures are weak, the result is a direct challenge to state sovereign authority. Even when PMFs are hired by strong states, decision making shifts beyond the states’ immediate control and is subject to the PMF’s own motivations, with all of the uncertainty that these processes entail. The very act of military outsourcing also runs counter to the tenet that states seek to maximize their power through self-sufficiency in order to minimize their reliance on others. Five potential impacts or disruptions on the state or global security environment caused by the private military industry are considered below.
(a) The New Fungibility of Power. Today, the entire spectrum of conventional forces can be obtained in a matter of days or weeks, for a price. A state or non-state entity need not have a large population, institutional support or expertise in order to wield capable military might. The barriers to acquiring military strength are lowered, making power more fungible than ever.
This ability to quickly transform money or other economic assets into force – that is, into a military threat – makes economic power itself more threatening, contrary to conventional assumptions. The capitalist ethos tends to assume only what is positive about the profit motive, and the spread of capitalism and globalism is seen, conventionally, as a way to reduce the incentives for violent conflict. However, the emergence of the PMF as a new type of private transnational firm, which relies instead on the existence of conflict for its profits, counters the assumption that non-state economic actors are generally peace orientated.
(b) New Complexities in the Balance of Power. The privatized military industry lies beyond any one state's control. The uncertainties of a dynamic global market creates major complications for the already-difficult task of assessing the balance of power between states. In an open market, where a wide range of military services can be procured, likely outcomes become increasingly difficult to discern. Once-predictable deterrence relationships can rapidly collapse, and the hire of PMFs can quickly and unexpectedly tilt local balances of power. Arms races might become instant bidding wars on the open market, with adversaries competing first for PMF services before taking to the battlefield. The result is that the pace of the race is accelerated, and first-mover advantages are heightened. Indeed, such changes could well increase the likelihood of war initiation and preemptive strikes. In addition, conventional arms control is made more difficult with the existence of this market. A nation-state can reduce its in-house force capacity, perhaps to comply with a treaty or avoid sanctions, without reducing its overall threat potential.
(c) Changes in Strategic Relationships. The privatized military market has fundamentally altered the former patron-client relationships of the Cold War. Instead of bowing to the demands of their superpower patrons in exchange for support and protection, weaker states can buy the military skills, training, and capabilities that they need on the open market. As a result, the patron’s leverage is diminished, and weaker states are no longer bound by their patrons’ prerogatives.
Traditionally, states in alliances have divided up their military tasks, making them more dependent on one another in the process. Now that PMFs can perform some of these tasks, mutual reliance among allied states is effectively reduced. A state may then feel less need for the approval of its allies in conducting its own affair, and ultimately the alliance may become weakened. For example, NATO members rely on the U.S. to supply much of its external deployment capacity (e.g., lift capacity, logistics, intelligence gathering and analysis). However, this capacity could also be adequately supplied by type 3 PMFs (military support firms).
The PMF market also makes available new forms of aid and alliances. Because PMFs allow the easy conversion of financial resources into military might, allies can provide military aid in the guise of simple cash infusions. The rationale for this new form of aid is that it lowers potential risks for donors by reducing the likelihood of their becoming embroiled in their allies’ fighting. In addition, possible donors are no longer restricted to states. With equal ability to pay, non-state actors, including even rich individuals, can become valuable allies, able to bolster local forces and shift military balances from a distance.
(d) Non-State Actors Empowered. The global private military industry provides easy access to military services, and therefore provides non-state actors with new options and paths to power not imagined until recently. The increase in military capability of non-state groups has resulted in a widening of conflicts and a lessening of weak states’ ability to put down internal opposition. In the current unregulated market, PMFs decide for whom they work. Thus far, they have contracted with all types of clients, from reputable governments to unsavory customers; the only limitation being the ability of the client to pay. Although some PMFs contend that they work only for reputable states, both the structure of the market and the record so far argue against this. Because firms make decisions that are in their own (financial) interest, single-shot payoffs from disreputable clients might prove too great a temptation, especially if the relationship can be hidden. PMFs that have difficulty attracting the business of reputable clients in the competitive market are the most likely to work with violent non-state entities.
(e) The Military Market Human Rights Abuses. Tensions exist regarding the impact of PMFs on human rights during conflict. On the one hand, PMFs point to market incentives for engaging in good behavior, as their long-term profits are partly dependent on having a good public image. PMFs also emphasize the positive impact that they might have in helping to professionalize local forces. On the other hand, however, war is a business in which nice firms might not finish first. PMF aspirations of corporate responsibility and a good-guy image may be overridden by the need to fulfill a contract or by the desire to be seen as the kind of firm that gets things done. Thus, in certain situations human rights may be transgressed for the corporate interest. For example, Executive Outcomes is known to have used fuel air explosives (FAEs or vacuum bombs) in its Angola operations. International organizations regard the use of FAEs as a transgression of human rights, because they inflict particularly torturous injuries. But FAEs are also highly effective, which explains why a firm would choose to use them.
The private military industry is an outlet for those naturally drawn to mercenary work and is likely to attract disreputable players looking for the cover of legitimacy. As employers, PMFs want to hire individuals who will be effective, even if this means casting a blind eye on past human rights abuses. As a result, many members of the most ruthless military and intelligence units (from the Soviet Union and the apartheid regime in South Africa) have found employment in the industry. Even when firms scrupulously screen prospective employees (which is easier said than done, given that most CVs do not have an “atrocities committed” section), it is still difficult to monitor troops in the field. If employees do commit violations, there is little incentive for firms to report them. A firm that does so risks scaring off both clients and prospective employees. Even if external legal action or sanctions were attempted, it is doubtful whether any PMF would allow its employees to be tried in a client state’s judicial system.
The ultimate problem with PMFs is that they diffuse responsibility. Questions about who monitors, regulates, and punishes employees or companies that go astray (“rogue firms”) have not been fully answered. That many of these firms are chartered in offshore accounts complicates the matter even further. In sum, privatization provides no greater assurance of moral military behavior and may even produce countervailing incentives.
(3) The Policy Impact of PMFs as Alternative Military Actors. The civilian-military relationship is a story of institutional balance (and sometimes imbalance), where civilian control over the military vies with the military’s need for autonomy to do its jobs. The privatized military industry may upset this balance because it supplants core military positions and functions. PMFs may be attractive to leaders, to the extent that they allow them to get rid of politically unreliable or untrustworthy military officers. Of course, local militaries know this and may seek to preempt such action if PMFs are to deploy. Additionally, the hire of PMFs would be destabilizing if any of the following conditions applies: (a) PMF employees receive higher pay than local soldiers for performing similar tasks; (b) PMF employees have vastly better equipment, (c) PMF employees are kept separate and distinct from local forces, or (d) PMF officers are placed in command positions or their presence blocks normal promotion tracks. At least (a) and (b), and possible (c) and (d) as well, are common in the relationship between U.S. troops and private forces currently in Iraq.
The rise of the privatized military industry provides a new means for leaders to evade public policy restrictions. In the U.S., for example, the executive branch can use PMFs as a means to circumvent limits placed on it by the Congress or by public opinion. The president, as commander in chief, may resort to using PMFs if he wishes to avoid the potential political costs of other actions (e.g., reinstating the draft), or if Congress places limits on troop numbers. Recourse to PMFs therefore has negative implications for the democratic principle of checks and balances. It may allow the executive branch to gain too much autonomy and power and undertake public-private activities against the intent of Congress.
The use of PMFs also allows the executive branch to avoid both public debate of its policies and accountability for results. Responsibility and accountability on the part of public officials are greatly diminished because the use of PMFs moves decision making power one step further away from elected representatives. The use of PMFs instead of official covert action provides the cover of plausible deniability that public forces lack. If an operation goes awry, the activities of a firm are easier for a government to deny and the blame easier to shift. But, without public debate and monitoring, the actions of PMFs may prove embarrassing or worse. In Colombia, for example, Airscan was implicated in coordinating the bombing of a village in which eighteen civilians (including nine children) were killed. In addition, PMF operations might even backfire and ultimately involve the client in direct fighting without the requisite public debate.
Conclusion
The rise of the modern privatized military industry has created a host of new problems and challenges. Nation-states no longer have an exclusive role in the military sphere. International institutions, non-state organizations, corporations, and even individuals can now lease military capabilities of the highest level from the global market. In terms of policy, just as Western militaries recently had to develop a system for working with NGOs during humanitarian operations, they now must also consider how to deal with PMFs, which they will increasingly encounter in the field. At the decision-making level, governments and international organizations must develop standard contracting policies and establish vetting and monitoring systems attuned to PMFs, including the assurance of legislative oversight. A policy that defers to the market will not curb threats to peace. PMFs, to the extent that they are, or are part of, publicly traded corporations, have a legal requirement to generate maximum profits for their shareholders. Not only is this a mandate for PMFs to seek out conflict wherever they can find it, but it is also a strong incentive to promote the escalation of existing tensions and even instigate new conflict where it does not yet exist. After all, they are in the business of war.
This concludes the three-part series.
Part 1: The Privatized Military Industry in the Global Context
Part 2: Organization and Operation of the Privatized Military Industry
.
FINAL in a Three-Part Series,
My recent posting, “Privatizing the War in Iraq”, describes the Bush administration’s growing reliance on private contractors such as Blackwater USA to conduct military operations in Iraq. Yet, the issues and potential problems with private contractors described in that posting are only the tip of the iceberg. In the new posting below, the many problems surrounding private military firms (PMFs) are more fully laid out. The source material for this posting is: P.W. Singer, “Corporate Warriors: The Rise and Ramifications of the Privatized Military Industry”, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter 2001/2002. Although Singer’s article, turned into a book, was published before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, its relevance has only increased in the last five years.
Impacts of the Privatized Military Industry on Conflict, Security, and Public Policy
The likely consequences of PMF activities fall into three broad categories: contractual dilemmas; military market dynamics and disruptions on security relations; and the policy impact of PMFs as alternative military actors.
(1) Contractual Dilemmas. Three types of contractual dilemmas are considered: the financial bottom line; monitoring and oversight, and the dependences of states on PMFs.
(a) The Bottome Line. At issue here are divided loyalties and different goals. Clear tensions exist between the client's security objectives and the PMF’s desire to maximize profit, so that the public good and the PMF’s good often conflict. In spite of claims to the contrary, the PMF may not act only in its client’s best interests. Given that the PMF’s focus is on the bottom line, it may have an incentive to cut corners to increase profits. For example, during the Balkans conflict, Brown & Root (a subsidiary of Halliburton) is alleged to have failed to deliver or severely overcharged the U.S. Army on four out of seven of its contractual obligations. In addition, PMFs have similar financial incentives to prolong their contracts and to avoid taking undue risks that might endanger their own corporate assets. The result may be a protracted conflict that could have been avoided. Finally, it is no stretch to imagine two arms of a large PMF contracting to support opposing sides in a conflict.
(b) Monitoring and Oversight. Few clients have experience in contracting with PMFs, and frequently there is little oversight and/or a lack of clearly defined requirements. Add in the fog of war, and proper monitoring becomes extremely difficult. Moreover, the actual consumer may not be the contracting party. Some nation-states pay PMFs to supply personnel on their behalf to their allies or to international organizations. The accountability gap between the server and served is becomes much wider in such cases.
(c) Dependence. As the use of PMFs becomes increasingly popular, so too does the danger that clients will become overly dependent on PMF services. Reliance on PMFs means that the client’s strategic success is vulnerable to changes in market conditions and to the client-PMF balance of power. This can result in three potential risks to the client. First, the PMF might leave its client in the lurch. A PMF may have no compunction about suspending a contract if a situation becomes financially or physically too risky. Because they are typically based elsewhere, and in the absence of applicable international laws to enforce compliance, PMFs face no real risk of punishment if they defect from their contractual obligations. The employees of PMFs cannot be forced to stay at their posts in the face danger. To the extent that entire military functions such as weapons maintenance and supply have become privatized, the entire military machine would break down if even a modest number of PMF employees chose to leave.
Second, the PMF might gain dominance over the client. In weak or failed nation-states, PMFs, which are often the most powerful force on the local scene, may take steps to protect their own interests. Thus early termination of a contract, dissatisfaction with the terms of payment, or disagreements over specific orders could lead to unpleasant repercussions for a weak client. For example, it is suspected that in 1996 Executive Outcomes helped to oust the leader of Sierra Leone, who headed the very regime that had hired it, in favor of another local general with whom the firm’s executives had a better working relationship.
Third, the PMF might engage in economic imperialism. Clients of (type 1, military provider) PMFs are often those most in need but least able to pay and thus at the highest risk of default. This imbalance can lead to the mortgaging of valuable public assets to the PMF or its associates in an attempt to align the client’s and firm’s incentives. For example, the PMF may obtain mineral rights following the fulfillment of its contract, or possibly in exchange for protecting those very resources and their production. A variation of this is the client’s promise to pay the PMF in public resources or assets currently held by enemy forces, following a successful campaign. Ultimately, the result is that valuable resources for the nation as a whole are lost in order to meet short-term exigencies.
(2) Military Market Dynamics and Disruptions. Military market dynamics and disruptions can complicate international security because military powers are no longer exclusively sovereign states but include private players. The privatized military industry is an independent, globalized supplier operating beyond any one state’s domain. Non-state actors can access formidable military capabilities, and where state structures are weak, the result is a direct challenge to state sovereign authority. Even when PMFs are hired by strong states, decision making shifts beyond the states’ immediate control and is subject to the PMF’s own motivations, with all of the uncertainty that these processes entail. The very act of military outsourcing also runs counter to the tenet that states seek to maximize their power through self-sufficiency in order to minimize their reliance on others. Five potential impacts or disruptions on the state or global security environment caused by the private military industry are considered below.
(a) The New Fungibility of Power. Today, the entire spectrum of conventional forces can be obtained in a matter of days or weeks, for a price. A state or non-state entity need not have a large population, institutional support or expertise in order to wield capable military might. The barriers to acquiring military strength are lowered, making power more fungible than ever.
This ability to quickly transform money or other economic assets into force – that is, into a military threat – makes economic power itself more threatening, contrary to conventional assumptions. The capitalist ethos tends to assume only what is positive about the profit motive, and the spread of capitalism and globalism is seen, conventionally, as a way to reduce the incentives for violent conflict. However, the emergence of the PMF as a new type of private transnational firm, which relies instead on the existence of conflict for its profits, counters the assumption that non-state economic actors are generally peace orientated.
(b) New Complexities in the Balance of Power. The privatized military industry lies beyond any one state's control. The uncertainties of a dynamic global market creates major complications for the already-difficult task of assessing the balance of power between states. In an open market, where a wide range of military services can be procured, likely outcomes become increasingly difficult to discern. Once-predictable deterrence relationships can rapidly collapse, and the hire of PMFs can quickly and unexpectedly tilt local balances of power. Arms races might become instant bidding wars on the open market, with adversaries competing first for PMF services before taking to the battlefield. The result is that the pace of the race is accelerated, and first-mover advantages are heightened. Indeed, such changes could well increase the likelihood of war initiation and preemptive strikes. In addition, conventional arms control is made more difficult with the existence of this market. A nation-state can reduce its in-house force capacity, perhaps to comply with a treaty or avoid sanctions, without reducing its overall threat potential.
(c) Changes in Strategic Relationships. The privatized military market has fundamentally altered the former patron-client relationships of the Cold War. Instead of bowing to the demands of their superpower patrons in exchange for support and protection, weaker states can buy the military skills, training, and capabilities that they need on the open market. As a result, the patron’s leverage is diminished, and weaker states are no longer bound by their patrons’ prerogatives.
Traditionally, states in alliances have divided up their military tasks, making them more dependent on one another in the process. Now that PMFs can perform some of these tasks, mutual reliance among allied states is effectively reduced. A state may then feel less need for the approval of its allies in conducting its own affair, and ultimately the alliance may become weakened. For example, NATO members rely on the U.S. to supply much of its external deployment capacity (e.g., lift capacity, logistics, intelligence gathering and analysis). However, this capacity could also be adequately supplied by type 3 PMFs (military support firms).
The PMF market also makes available new forms of aid and alliances. Because PMFs allow the easy conversion of financial resources into military might, allies can provide military aid in the guise of simple cash infusions. The rationale for this new form of aid is that it lowers potential risks for donors by reducing the likelihood of their becoming embroiled in their allies’ fighting. In addition, possible donors are no longer restricted to states. With equal ability to pay, non-state actors, including even rich individuals, can become valuable allies, able to bolster local forces and shift military balances from a distance.
(d) Non-State Actors Empowered. The global private military industry provides easy access to military services, and therefore provides non-state actors with new options and paths to power not imagined until recently. The increase in military capability of non-state groups has resulted in a widening of conflicts and a lessening of weak states’ ability to put down internal opposition. In the current unregulated market, PMFs decide for whom they work. Thus far, they have contracted with all types of clients, from reputable governments to unsavory customers; the only limitation being the ability of the client to pay. Although some PMFs contend that they work only for reputable states, both the structure of the market and the record so far argue against this. Because firms make decisions that are in their own (financial) interest, single-shot payoffs from disreputable clients might prove too great a temptation, especially if the relationship can be hidden. PMFs that have difficulty attracting the business of reputable clients in the competitive market are the most likely to work with violent non-state entities.
(e) The Military Market Human Rights Abuses. Tensions exist regarding the impact of PMFs on human rights during conflict. On the one hand, PMFs point to market incentives for engaging in good behavior, as their long-term profits are partly dependent on having a good public image. PMFs also emphasize the positive impact that they might have in helping to professionalize local forces. On the other hand, however, war is a business in which nice firms might not finish first. PMF aspirations of corporate responsibility and a good-guy image may be overridden by the need to fulfill a contract or by the desire to be seen as the kind of firm that gets things done. Thus, in certain situations human rights may be transgressed for the corporate interest. For example, Executive Outcomes is known to have used fuel air explosives (FAEs or vacuum bombs) in its Angola operations. International organizations regard the use of FAEs as a transgression of human rights, because they inflict particularly torturous injuries. But FAEs are also highly effective, which explains why a firm would choose to use them.
The private military industry is an outlet for those naturally drawn to mercenary work and is likely to attract disreputable players looking for the cover of legitimacy. As employers, PMFs want to hire individuals who will be effective, even if this means casting a blind eye on past human rights abuses. As a result, many members of the most ruthless military and intelligence units (from the Soviet Union and the apartheid regime in South Africa) have found employment in the industry. Even when firms scrupulously screen prospective employees (which is easier said than done, given that most CVs do not have an “atrocities committed” section), it is still difficult to monitor troops in the field. If employees do commit violations, there is little incentive for firms to report them. A firm that does so risks scaring off both clients and prospective employees. Even if external legal action or sanctions were attempted, it is doubtful whether any PMF would allow its employees to be tried in a client state’s judicial system.
The ultimate problem with PMFs is that they diffuse responsibility. Questions about who monitors, regulates, and punishes employees or companies that go astray (“rogue firms”) have not been fully answered. That many of these firms are chartered in offshore accounts complicates the matter even further. In sum, privatization provides no greater assurance of moral military behavior and may even produce countervailing incentives.
(3) The Policy Impact of PMFs as Alternative Military Actors. The civilian-military relationship is a story of institutional balance (and sometimes imbalance), where civilian control over the military vies with the military’s need for autonomy to do its jobs. The privatized military industry may upset this balance because it supplants core military positions and functions. PMFs may be attractive to leaders, to the extent that they allow them to get rid of politically unreliable or untrustworthy military officers. Of course, local militaries know this and may seek to preempt such action if PMFs are to deploy. Additionally, the hire of PMFs would be destabilizing if any of the following conditions applies: (a) PMF employees receive higher pay than local soldiers for performing similar tasks; (b) PMF employees have vastly better equipment, (c) PMF employees are kept separate and distinct from local forces, or (d) PMF officers are placed in command positions or their presence blocks normal promotion tracks. At least (a) and (b), and possible (c) and (d) as well, are common in the relationship between U.S. troops and private forces currently in Iraq.
The rise of the privatized military industry provides a new means for leaders to evade public policy restrictions. In the U.S., for example, the executive branch can use PMFs as a means to circumvent limits placed on it by the Congress or by public opinion. The president, as commander in chief, may resort to using PMFs if he wishes to avoid the potential political costs of other actions (e.g., reinstating the draft), or if Congress places limits on troop numbers. Recourse to PMFs therefore has negative implications for the democratic principle of checks and balances. It may allow the executive branch to gain too much autonomy and power and undertake public-private activities against the intent of Congress.
The use of PMFs also allows the executive branch to avoid both public debate of its policies and accountability for results. Responsibility and accountability on the part of public officials are greatly diminished because the use of PMFs moves decision making power one step further away from elected representatives. The use of PMFs instead of official covert action provides the cover of plausible deniability that public forces lack. If an operation goes awry, the activities of a firm are easier for a government to deny and the blame easier to shift. But, without public debate and monitoring, the actions of PMFs may prove embarrassing or worse. In Colombia, for example, Airscan was implicated in coordinating the bombing of a village in which eighteen civilians (including nine children) were killed. In addition, PMF operations might even backfire and ultimately involve the client in direct fighting without the requisite public debate.
Conclusion
The rise of the modern privatized military industry has created a host of new problems and challenges. Nation-states no longer have an exclusive role in the military sphere. International institutions, non-state organizations, corporations, and even individuals can now lease military capabilities of the highest level from the global market. In terms of policy, just as Western militaries recently had to develop a system for working with NGOs during humanitarian operations, they now must also consider how to deal with PMFs, which they will increasingly encounter in the field. At the decision-making level, governments and international organizations must develop standard contracting policies and establish vetting and monitoring systems attuned to PMFs, including the assurance of legislative oversight. A policy that defers to the market will not curb threats to peace. PMFs, to the extent that they are, or are part of, publicly traded corporations, have a legal requirement to generate maximum profits for their shareholders. Not only is this a mandate for PMFs to seek out conflict wherever they can find it, but it is also a strong incentive to promote the escalation of existing tensions and even instigate new conflict where it does not yet exist. After all, they are in the business of war.
This concludes the three-part series.
Part 1: The Privatized Military Industry in the Global Context
Part 2: Organization and Operation of the Privatized Military Industry
.
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March 12, 2007
The Problem with Privatizing War
Guest Writer: L. Vincent Sebastian
FIRST in a Three-Part Series,
My recent posting, “Privatizing the War in Iraq”, describes the Bush administration’s growing reliance on private contractors such as Blackwater USA to conduct military operations in Iraq. Yet, the issues and potential problems with private contractors described in that posting are only the tip of the iceberg. In the new posting below, the many problems surrounding private military firms (PMFs) are more fully laid out. The source material for this posting is: P.W. Singer, “Corporate Warriors: The Rise and Ramifications of the Privatized Military Industry”, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter 2001/2002. Although Singer’s article, turned into a book, was published before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, its relevance has only increased in the last five years.
The Privatized Military Industry in the Global Context
(a) Introduction: Private military firms are profit-driven organizations that trade in professional services intricately linked to warfare. They are corporate businesses that specialize in the provision of a wide range of military skills and services, including tactical combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence gathering and analysis, operational support, logistics support, troop training, military technical assistance, and post-conflict resolution. PMF capabilities extend across the entire spectrum of military activity, from a team of commandos to a wing of fighter jets. PMFs actively advertise their services, and one can gain access to them simply by becoming a business client.
As the principal private actors in warfare, today's PMFs have evolved far beyond ad-hoc groups of mercenaries. PMFs operate and compete openly on the international market, and provide military skills and services to a wide variety and number of clients. PMFs can gain a competitive advantage in serving niche markets through specialization within the military sector. PMFs are often tied through complex financial arrangements to other firms, both within and beyond their own industry. Many of the most active PMFs are subsidiaries of larger corporations listed on public stock exchanges. For a large multinational corporation, the addition of profitable military services to their list of offerings may help support their bottom line. Because PMFs maintain permanent corporate hierarchies, they can make use of complex corporate financing schemes and can engage in a wide variety of deals and contracts. As legal entities, PMFs are at least nominally tied to their home nations through laws requiring registration and licensing, although codified standards for corporate behavior vary widely among countries. PMFs are contractually bound to their clients and can work for multiple clients in multiple markets or theaters at once.
(b) Historical Background: The private provision of violence was a routine aspect of international relations before the twentieth century, and every empire from Ancient Egypt to Victorian England utilized contract forces. By the twentieth century, a system of state sovereignty had spread across the globe, and with the rise of superpowers the social-political norm ran against private armies. But, the 1990’s witnessed a resurgence of private military activity around the world. Every major U.S. military operation in the post-Cold War era (Iraq 1991, Somalia, Haiti, Zaire, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq 2003) has involved significant and growing levels of PMF support. In addition, corporations, international organizations, and even individuals now rely increasingly on military/ security services supplied by the private market.
The growth in the private military industry has resulted from the changed global security environment at the end of the 20th century compounded by the Bush administration’s global war on terrorism. The end of the Cold War resulted in massive disruptions in the supply and demand of capable military forces. In the 1990s, the world’s armies shrank by more than 6 million personnel, and a huge number of individuals with military skills found themselves looking for work, including for example an estimated 70 percent of the former KGB. Many elite units, such as apartheid South Africa’s 32nd Reconnaissance Battalion, simply kept their structure and formed their own private companies. At the same time, massive arms stocks flooded the market. Machine guns, tanks, and even fighter jets became available to anyone who could afford them. With the end of superpower pressure for stability, new security threats began to appear, many involving ethnic or internal conflicts.
(c) PMF Services: Supply and Demand No longer strategic pawns of the Cold War and shorn of their superpower support, many nation-states have suffered breakdowns in governance, and have seen a decrease in their ability to respond to internal and external threats. This has been particularly true in developing areas, where many regimes lack any real political authority or capability. The security apparatuses – local military and police – of these regimes are likely to be deficient to some extent, and PMFs have aimed to fill the void. As one company executive explained, “The end of the Cold War has allowed conflicts long suppressed or manipulated by the superpowers to reemerge. At the same time, most armies have got smaller, and live footage on CNN of U.S. soldiers being killed in Somalia has had staggering effects on the willingness of governments to commit to foreign conflicts. We fill the gap.”
Two other trends have helped raise the demand for PMF services. First, the military operations of great powers have become more high-tech, and civilian specialists are relied on more than ever to run these increasingly sophisticated military systems. With sophisticated military technology, strategic objectives can be achieved by a relatively small number of soldiers who may not even be on the battlefield. Fewer individuals are doing the actual fighting, while massive, high-tech, and information-intensive support systems are required to maintain modern forces. Economic realities are creating an in-house vacuum of high-tech military support personnel, and the armed forces of nation-states must rely increasingly on specialized expertise provided by the private sector. Such expertise is in demand in all sectors of the economy, not just the military, so the best and brightest in the public armed forces are often lured away by the higher salaries of private employment.
Second, the primary tools of warfare – conventional weapons – have both diversified and become more available to a broader array of actors. Non-state actors with newfound ability to disrupt world society are increasing in number, power, and stature: regional warlords, terrorist networks, and drug cartels. The opportunity for profit may be as much a cause of conflict as socio-political factors. With the global spread of cheap infantry weapons, individuals and small groups can purchase and wield disproportionately large military might. Almost any group operating inside a weak nation-state can acquire at least limited military capabilities, which lowers the bar for creating viable threats to the status quo. Furthermore, this shift in the balance of power from states to non-state actors encourages the proliferation and criminalization of local warring groups. With enough money anyone can equip a powerful military force, and with a willingness to use crime, anyone can generate enough money. Many local conflicts have lost the ideological motivation they once had and instead have become grabs for local resources. As a result, warfare itself becomes self-perpetuating, as violence generates profit for those who wield it most effectively (which often means most brutally), while no one group can eliminate the others. PMFs thrive in such profit-oriented conflicts, either working for these new conflict groups or reacting to the humanitarian disasters they create.
The last few decades have seen a shift toward the marketization of the public sphere, which has gone hand in hand with globalization. Both are premised on the belief that the principles of comparative advantage and competition maximize efficiency and effectiveness. Privatization, with an emphasis on downsizing government, is the economic policy of choice among many of the world’s elite. At the same time, outsourcing has become a dominant strategy of the modern corporation and a huge industry in its own right. Global outsourcing expenditures topped $1 trillion in 2001, a doubling from three years earlier. Thus, the use of profit-motivated military service providers has become not only a viable option but frequently the favored solution for both public institutions and private organizations. The successes of privatization programs and outsourcing strategies in other sectors of the economy have helped give PMFs the stamp of legitimacy.
End of the FIRST in a three-part series.
Part 2: Organization and Operation of the Privatized Military Industry
Part 3: Impacts of the Privatized Military Industry on Conflict, Security, and Public Policy
.
FIRST in a Three-Part Series,
My recent posting, “Privatizing the War in Iraq”, describes the Bush administration’s growing reliance on private contractors such as Blackwater USA to conduct military operations in Iraq. Yet, the issues and potential problems with private contractors described in that posting are only the tip of the iceberg. In the new posting below, the many problems surrounding private military firms (PMFs) are more fully laid out. The source material for this posting is: P.W. Singer, “Corporate Warriors: The Rise and Ramifications of the Privatized Military Industry”, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter 2001/2002. Although Singer’s article, turned into a book, was published before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, its relevance has only increased in the last five years.
The Privatized Military Industry in the Global Context
(a) Introduction: Private military firms are profit-driven organizations that trade in professional services intricately linked to warfare. They are corporate businesses that specialize in the provision of a wide range of military skills and services, including tactical combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence gathering and analysis, operational support, logistics support, troop training, military technical assistance, and post-conflict resolution. PMF capabilities extend across the entire spectrum of military activity, from a team of commandos to a wing of fighter jets. PMFs actively advertise their services, and one can gain access to them simply by becoming a business client.
As the principal private actors in warfare, today's PMFs have evolved far beyond ad-hoc groups of mercenaries. PMFs operate and compete openly on the international market, and provide military skills and services to a wide variety and number of clients. PMFs can gain a competitive advantage in serving niche markets through specialization within the military sector. PMFs are often tied through complex financial arrangements to other firms, both within and beyond their own industry. Many of the most active PMFs are subsidiaries of larger corporations listed on public stock exchanges. For a large multinational corporation, the addition of profitable military services to their list of offerings may help support their bottom line. Because PMFs maintain permanent corporate hierarchies, they can make use of complex corporate financing schemes and can engage in a wide variety of deals and contracts. As legal entities, PMFs are at least nominally tied to their home nations through laws requiring registration and licensing, although codified standards for corporate behavior vary widely among countries. PMFs are contractually bound to their clients and can work for multiple clients in multiple markets or theaters at once.
(b) Historical Background: The private provision of violence was a routine aspect of international relations before the twentieth century, and every empire from Ancient Egypt to Victorian England utilized contract forces. By the twentieth century, a system of state sovereignty had spread across the globe, and with the rise of superpowers the social-political norm ran against private armies. But, the 1990’s witnessed a resurgence of private military activity around the world. Every major U.S. military operation in the post-Cold War era (Iraq 1991, Somalia, Haiti, Zaire, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq 2003) has involved significant and growing levels of PMF support. In addition, corporations, international organizations, and even individuals now rely increasingly on military/ security services supplied by the private market.
The growth in the private military industry has resulted from the changed global security environment at the end of the 20th century compounded by the Bush administration’s global war on terrorism. The end of the Cold War resulted in massive disruptions in the supply and demand of capable military forces. In the 1990s, the world’s armies shrank by more than 6 million personnel, and a huge number of individuals with military skills found themselves looking for work, including for example an estimated 70 percent of the former KGB. Many elite units, such as apartheid South Africa’s 32nd Reconnaissance Battalion, simply kept their structure and formed their own private companies. At the same time, massive arms stocks flooded the market. Machine guns, tanks, and even fighter jets became available to anyone who could afford them. With the end of superpower pressure for stability, new security threats began to appear, many involving ethnic or internal conflicts.
(c) PMF Services: Supply and Demand No longer strategic pawns of the Cold War and shorn of their superpower support, many nation-states have suffered breakdowns in governance, and have seen a decrease in their ability to respond to internal and external threats. This has been particularly true in developing areas, where many regimes lack any real political authority or capability. The security apparatuses – local military and police – of these regimes are likely to be deficient to some extent, and PMFs have aimed to fill the void. As one company executive explained, “The end of the Cold War has allowed conflicts long suppressed or manipulated by the superpowers to reemerge. At the same time, most armies have got smaller, and live footage on CNN of U.S. soldiers being killed in Somalia has had staggering effects on the willingness of governments to commit to foreign conflicts. We fill the gap.”
Two other trends have helped raise the demand for PMF services. First, the military operations of great powers have become more high-tech, and civilian specialists are relied on more than ever to run these increasingly sophisticated military systems. With sophisticated military technology, strategic objectives can be achieved by a relatively small number of soldiers who may not even be on the battlefield. Fewer individuals are doing the actual fighting, while massive, high-tech, and information-intensive support systems are required to maintain modern forces. Economic realities are creating an in-house vacuum of high-tech military support personnel, and the armed forces of nation-states must rely increasingly on specialized expertise provided by the private sector. Such expertise is in demand in all sectors of the economy, not just the military, so the best and brightest in the public armed forces are often lured away by the higher salaries of private employment.
Second, the primary tools of warfare – conventional weapons – have both diversified and become more available to a broader array of actors. Non-state actors with newfound ability to disrupt world society are increasing in number, power, and stature: regional warlords, terrorist networks, and drug cartels. The opportunity for profit may be as much a cause of conflict as socio-political factors. With the global spread of cheap infantry weapons, individuals and small groups can purchase and wield disproportionately large military might. Almost any group operating inside a weak nation-state can acquire at least limited military capabilities, which lowers the bar for creating viable threats to the status quo. Furthermore, this shift in the balance of power from states to non-state actors encourages the proliferation and criminalization of local warring groups. With enough money anyone can equip a powerful military force, and with a willingness to use crime, anyone can generate enough money. Many local conflicts have lost the ideological motivation they once had and instead have become grabs for local resources. As a result, warfare itself becomes self-perpetuating, as violence generates profit for those who wield it most effectively (which often means most brutally), while no one group can eliminate the others. PMFs thrive in such profit-oriented conflicts, either working for these new conflict groups or reacting to the humanitarian disasters they create.
The last few decades have seen a shift toward the marketization of the public sphere, which has gone hand in hand with globalization. Both are premised on the belief that the principles of comparative advantage and competition maximize efficiency and effectiveness. Privatization, with an emphasis on downsizing government, is the economic policy of choice among many of the world’s elite. At the same time, outsourcing has become a dominant strategy of the modern corporation and a huge industry in its own right. Global outsourcing expenditures topped $1 trillion in 2001, a doubling from three years earlier. Thus, the use of profit-motivated military service providers has become not only a viable option but frequently the favored solution for both public institutions and private organizations. The successes of privatization programs and outsourcing strategies in other sectors of the economy have helped give PMFs the stamp of legitimacy.
End of the FIRST in a three-part series.
Part 2: Organization and Operation of the Privatized Military Industry
Part 3: Impacts of the Privatized Military Industry on Conflict, Security, and Public Policy
.
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